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RESEARCH PROJECT ABSTRACT 
Problems of population settlement, urbanization, in-
dustrial development, technology advancement, and the depletion 
and dissipation of the natural resources of Washington state have 
initiated a variety of responses from the legislature in the form 
of three major environmental statutes. These ares the State En-
vironmental Policy Act, the Shoreline Management Act, and the 
Environmental Coordination Procedures Act. Together, these acts 
constitute a unique legislative response among the states in 
their attempt to channel development through environmental law. 
It is the thesis of this case study that the legal ambit 
of environmental management is the continuing interaction in-
volving the legislative intent, administrative implementation, 
and judicial interpretation of environmental law. 
The purpose of this case study is to describe this 
legal ambit by examining the acts themselves, their administra-
tive guidelines, and a corpus of case arising from their imple-
mentation1 and to suggest a coordinated administrative scheme 
whereby the intent of these three unique statutes can be more 
fully realized. 
The environmental impact statement was selected as 
the coordinating vehicle. The master application procedures 
under the Environmental Coordination Procedures Act was selected 
as the coordinating framework to process required impact state-
i 
ii 
ments and permits. 
The concl usion of the study is that environmental 
management is lacking a theoretical base for its decisions. 
The evolution of administrative functions has progressed 
from regulation, to allocation, and finally , to planning. 
Who should receive the benefits of development and 
order? Who should pay the costs of development and order? 
A theory of planning law needs to be related to the distri-
bution of environmental amenities . 
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PREFACE 
"Some people have stated our supply 
program is now inadequate, but I don't think 
that's true," said the board president. "It's 
still adequate, only for a shorter time." 
You see? Nothing to worry about. 
iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
RESEARCH PROJECT ABSTRACT • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
PREFACE • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
INTRODUCTION t I I I I I I I I I I I I I t I I I t I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I t I I I t t I 
Chapter 
ONE. 
TWO. 
THREE . 
FOUR . 
FIVE. 
LEGISLATIVE INTENT I I • I • I I I I I I I I I I I I t I I I I I I I t I 
State Environmental Policy Act ••••••••••••• 
Shoreline Management Act ••••••••••••••••••• 
Environmental Coordination Procedures Act •• 
ADMINISTRATIVE I MPLEMENTATION • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
State Environmental Policy Act Guidelines •• 
Shoreline Management Act Guidelines •••••••• 
Environmental Coordination Procedures Act 
Master Application Procedures •••••••••••• 
JUDI CIAL INTERPRETATION • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
SUGGESTED ADMINISTRATIVE SCHEME • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE FUTURE • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
i 
iii 
iv 
1 
8 
8 
14 
18 
21 
21 
JO 
37 
4J 
77 
85 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
FOOTNOTES I I I I I I t t t I I I t I I I I I I I t I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I a I I I I I 88 
BIBLIOGRAPHY • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 99 
v 
INTRODUCTION 
The abundant natural resources of Washington are re-
sponsible for both the success of its economy and the quality 
of life of its residents. The state of Washington in the Paci-
fic Northwest is a leader, economically, in many ways. Wash-
ington's agricultural sector, with its large production of 
fruits, berries, and other crops places it first among the 
states in apples, blueberries, red raspberries and hops, to men-
tion but a few. The state is among the top producers of pota-
t oes, winter wheat--it ranks third--pears, grapes, filberts, 
and strawberries. 
More than half of the state is in forests; one sixth of 
the nation's standing sawtimber is in Washington. Towering 
Doublas firs and Ponderosa pines, western hemlocks, and red 
cedar are among the commercially important trees. Forests also 
have a social value, they are useful as places of recreation, 
watershed protection, and scenery . 
Mineral and mineral related production is a major indus-
try in the state. Sand and gravel, silver, cement, zinc, and 
lead are the most important products. Large aluminum reduc-
tion plants, using refined ore from out-of-state and hydro-
electric power have expanded. Aluminum output is 25% of the 
United States total. Washington is the headquarters for the 
world's largest producers of aircraft, the Boeing Airplane 
2 
Company. 
The waters and shorelines of Washington are also impor-
tant economic resources. The commercial fishing catch--of 
which salmon account for half the total, followed by halibut 
and bottomfish--contributes significantly to the state's over-
all economy. The Port of Seattle is the nation's fourth lar-
gest containerized shipping seaport. Seattle is also a ma-
jor import-export center for the far east.1 
Wa:ter.1.: as a resource is abundant, but competing, or po-
tentially competing claims, are placed on it for irrigational, 
industrial, and recreational purposes, and energy production. 
Washington has been noted for its abundant supplies of low-
cost hydroelectric power. Yet concern is growing over the in-
creased demand for energy within the region and from other re-
gions. Agriculture, aluminum reduction, aircraft production--
key industries in Washington--are highly energy-intensive. With 
few suitable sites for hydroelectric dams remaining, utilities 
are turning their attention to thermal power plants, including 
both coal-powered and nuclear-powered ones. The environmental 
and social costs and benefits associated with coal and nuclear 
powered plants appear more difficult to assess and accept than 
those accompanying hydro-electric power. 2 
Thus, the natural resou~ces of the state are essential 
to its economy. But Washington's natural resources are equally 
important as places of recreation, capable of rejuvenating the 
body, and spirit--as its citizens, and visitors to the state, 
will attest. The diversity and splendor of Washington is 
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arguably, unequalled anywhere else in the world. 
These differing, and often conflicting perspectives con-
cerning the use of land are important. Land development and eco-
nomic growth, historically, has been based on resource exploi-
tation. Land was perceived as a commodity, its use usually de-
termined by the economic laws of the free market, supply and de-
mand. Indeed, it was the federal government's policy in the 
nineteenth century to dispose of land in promoting westward ex-
pansion. 3 
A new sense of scarcity arose in this country with the 
settling of the West. This new perspective provided fertile 
ground for the seeds of the conservation movement. The percep-
tion of land underwent a transformation, from land as a commodi-
ty to land as a basic natural resource--its use to be determined 
and managed by the government, for present and future citizens.4 
The task of reconciling these perspectives concerning the use 
of land, and other basic natural resources, can be termed "en-
vironmental management." 
The Washington state legislature has responded to these 
conflicting perspective's over the use of the state's natural 
resources with a unique set of environmental statutes. This 
paper is a case study of the three "major" environmental statutes 
of Washington: the State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA),5 the 
Shoreline Management Act (SMA) ,6 and the Environmental Coordina-
tion Procedures Act (ECPA).7 The criteria of "major" is used 
here to denote those ··· environmental statutes which have broad 
(or possess the potential for broad) applicability--over develop-
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ment in the state, and in governmental decision making i nvol v-
ing actions which affect the environment. These three statutes 
were selected because they are the most expansive acts in terms 
of legislative policy and administrative application. As such, 
they represent a substantial effort by the legislature to estab-
lish the consideration of environmental values as part of govern-
mental decision making in Washington. When considered together, 
SEPA, SMA, and ECPA are singularly unique among the states, in 
their attempt to channel development through environmental law.8 
The concept of environmental management has been given 
credence by these statutes of Washington which address the pro-
blems of population settlement, urbanization, industrial develop-
ment, technology advancement, and degradation to the environment 
and dissipation of natural resources, 
The intent of this case study rs twofold: (1) Describe 
the legal ambit of environmental management in Washington as 
it pertains to the three selected environmental statutes; and, 
(2) Suggest how ·these· statutes might be coordinated in order to 
provide the participants in land development--the developers, 
the public, and the administrative decision making body--with a 
better process of gathering, analyzing, and evaluating environ-
mental information. The processing of environmental information 
and the administration of a regulatory scheme are the major 
functions of environmental management. 
This case study can also contribute to the growing public 
awareness regarding land development by indicating how citizens 
are able to gain acce s s to the decision making process, and how 
5 
they may gain standing before the courts for the purpose of re-
viewing "environmental" decisions . 
The legislature sets forth its decisions on basic policy 
issues, the legislative intent. The duty of carrying out the 
legislative intent is delegated to the administrative body. The 
administrative body is authorized to implement the legislatiye 
intent--as expressed in the three environmental statutes. The 
judiciary reviews conflicts arising out of the implementation 
of the statutes in order to determine: the ascertainment of per-
tinent facts, the application of proper legal doctrines and rules, 
compliance with the law, and an appropriate remedy in the case 
at hand. The judicial review provides us. with an interpreta-
tion of the law as enacted by the legislature and carried out 
by the administrative body. 
It is the thesis of this case study that the legal ambit 
of environmental management is the continuing interaction in-
volving the legislative intent, administrative implementation, 
and judicial interpretation, of environmental law. 
The scope of this study is generally confined to the 
statutes themselves, their guidelines, and the corpus of case 
law involving these statutes (as of this writing, ECPA does not 
have a corpus of case law). Telephone conservations with the 
appropriate state agencies have been conducted in order to en-
sure the reliability of some of the secondary resource materials 
used in this study. An analysis and evaluation of the political 
considerations accompanying the implementation of these statutes 
is considered to lie beyond the purview of this case study.9 
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The organization of the case study is as follows. Chap-
ter One will discuss the legislative policies as expressed in 
SEPA, SMA, and ECPA. Primary attention will be given to those 
sections which are vital to the implementation of the acts (as 
clearly indicated by their inclusion in numerous court cases 
or i n the coordinative scheme). Those sections containing am-
biguous or conflicti ng language, which is given greater clarity 
by judicial review, are also included. 
Chapter Two presents a discussion of pertinent admini-
strative guidelines established in order to implement the legi-
slative intent of the three environmental statutes. Again, sec-
tions that are emphasized are done so because they have proven 
essential to a vigorous application of the acts or are included 
in the proposed coordinative sbheme. 
Chapter Three includes a corpus of case law-~Washington 
Superior Court, Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court--for 
1973-1976. These cases are presented chronologically so as to 
allow us to discern how the legal ambit of environment manage-
ment has evolved. Two basic issues are particularly relevant to 
environmental management which should be kept in mind: (1) What 
evidence should be considered, and when, by the administrative 
agency in making its decision? and, (2) Is that decision, and 
subsequent administrative action, a proper exercise of its legal 
authority? 
Chapter Four presents an outline of the coordinative : 
scheme, with ECPA providing the legal structure for political 
participation, and the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) as 
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required under SEPA, and SMA, ip certain cases, 10 .functioning 
as the coordinative vehicle. A hypothetical proposal for develop-
ment will be posited and followed through the suggested coordi-
native scheme in order to examine how the system works. 
In Chapter Five recommendations for further study re-
garding environmental law will be presented. This chapter will 
conclude with a brief discussion on economic growth, environ-
mental law, and the changing role of government in contemporary 
society. 
Note: In all cases where the underline is used, it is 
for the author's purpose ·,of emphasis, except where otherwise 
indicated. 
CHAPTER ONE 
LEGISLATIVE INTENT 
The legislative intent of the three selected environ-
mental statutes repres·ents a unique response to resource use, 
allocation, and preservation (particularly land and water) at 
the state level. In our democratic system of government, the 
legislative intent of environmental policy is- the implicit 
policy of the residents of the state. As it will be seen in 
chapter three, the legislative policy is especially important in 
judicial review proceedings applying the "clearly erroneous" 
standard. When the court applies this review standard, the in-
tent of the legislature becomes part of the record by which the 
court, using the policy as a guide, determines if the administra-
tive body has carried out its duties in the public's interest. 
State Environmental Policy Act of 1971 (SEPA) 
SEPA is an expression of the legislature's recognition 
of the interrelationship between man and his environment. It 
especially notes the profound impact of man's activity on his 
environment due to the influences of population growth, high-
densi ty urbanization, industrial expansion, resource utilization 
and exploitation, and new and expanding technological advances.1 
One of the primary purposes of SEPA is to promote efforts which 
will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment. 2 The 
legislature in SEPA declares that it is the continuing policy 
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of the state of Washington, in cooperation with federal and 
local gover nments, and other concerned public and private organi-
zations "to use all practicable means and measures • • • in a 
manner calculated to: 
(a ) Foster and promote the general welfare; (b) to create 
and maintain conditions under which man and nature can 
exist in productive harmony; and (c) fulfill the social, 
economic, and other requirements of present and future 
generations of Washington citizens.J 
Not only is it the policy of the state to merely main-
tain conditions of harmony, but those involved are to create 
conditions of productive harmony, this appears to be an action 
oriented mandate. The responsibility of maintaining and crea-
ting this productive hannony, is to those of future generations 
as well as the present orie, The enviDonmental management frame-
work established takes on increasing importance as it is to con-
tinue in perpetuity. 
The section designating what agencies are to be respon-
sible for carrying out SEPA is all encompassing. RCW 4J.21C.020-
(2) states this, and also what they are responsible for: 
In order to car~y out the policy set forth in this chap-
ter, it is the continuing responsibility of the state of 
Washington and all agencies of the state to use all prac-
ticable means, consistent with other essential considera-
tions of state policy, to improve and coordinate plans, 
functions, programs, and resources t .o the end that the 
state and its citizens may: 
(a) Fulfill the responsibilities of each generation 
as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations; 
(b) Assure for all people of Washington safe, health-
ful, productive, and esthetically and culturally plea-
sing surroundings; 
(c) Attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the 
environment without , degradation,-r.lsk: to health or safe-
ty, or other undesirable and unintended consequences; 
( d) Preserve important h.istoric, cultural, and natural 
aspects of our national heritage; 
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(e) Maintain, wherever possible, an environment which 
supports diversity and variety of individual choice; 
(f) Achieve a balance between population and resource 
use which will permit high standards of living and a 
wide sharing of life's amenities; and 
(g) Enhance the quality of renewable resources and 
approach the maximum attainable recyling of depleta-
ble resources. 
All agencies of the state are included as being responsible for 
carrying out the lofty environmental policy. "Undesirable and 
unintended consequences" are to be ~voided1 in other words, en-
vironmental values are to be consi~ered to ensure the creation 
and maintenance of healthful surroundings through deliberation, 
not degradation by default. 
Of particular interest in. the legislative declarations 
is the apparent creation of an "environmental right" which is 
extended to all people of the state:4 
The legislature recognizes that each person has a fun-
damental and inalienable right to a health.f'ul _environ-
ment and that each person has a responsibility to con-
tribute to the preservation and enhancement of the en-
vironment. 5 
This is a st·atutorily granted right, not a constitutional 
one. However the scope of substantive legal rights has been 
given an expansive ambit by the Supreme Court in Leschi Improve-
ment Council v. State Highwey Commission6 where the court held 
that the procedural process of SEPA was created by the legisla-
ture to protect each person's "fundamental and inalienable right 
to a healthful environment." (This case is discussed · in .more de-
tail in chapter three, "Judicial Interpretation".) 
The means by which the administrative body is to imple-
ment the legislative intent is outlined in 43.21co30, the proce-
11 
dural process. Most of this section is presented below due to 
its significance as an indication of how the government is to 
protect the "environmental rights" of the people. This section 
is used by the court in order to determine the procedural cor-
rectness of administratiV.~ decision making. It reads as follows. 
The legislature authorizes and directs that, to the fill-
lest extent possible: (1) The policies, regulations, and 
laws of the state of Washington shall be interpreted and 
administered in accordance with the policies set forth 
in this chapter, and (2) all branches of government of 
this state, including state agencies, municipal and pub-
lic corporations, and counties shall: 
(a) Utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach 
which will insure the integrated use of the natural and 
social sciences and the environmental design arts in 
planning and in decision making which may have an im-
pact on man's environment; 
(b) Identify and develop methods and procedures, in 
consultation with the department of ecology and the 
ecological commission, which will insure that presently 
unquantified environmental amenities and values will be 
given appropriate consideration in decision making al.ong 
with economic and technical considerations; 
(c) Include in every recommendation or report on 
proposals for legislation and other major actions sig-
nificantly affecting the quality of the environment, a 
detailed statement by the responsible official on: 
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action; 
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot 
be avoided should the proposal be implemented; 
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action; 
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses 
of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement 
of long-term productivity; and 
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of 
resources which would be involved in the proposed action 
should it be implemented; 
(d) Prior to making any detailed statement, the re-
sponsible official shall consult with and obtain the 
comments of any public agency which has jurisdiction by 
law or special expertise with respect to any environ-
mental impact involved ••• 
(e) Study, develop, and descrive appropriate alter-
native uses of available resou·rces; 
. . . 
SEPA is patterned very closely upon the National Environ-
12 
mental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 u.s.C.A. Sec. 4321 et seq. 
A noteworthy difference is that while NEPA applies only to the 
Federal government and its various departments and agencies, 
SEPA applies to the state goverrunent plus all municipal and 
public corporations and counties. (SEPA, as originally pro-
posed, would only have included state agencies, but House amend-
ments extended coverage ·. to local governments. See Senate Jour-
nal, 1971 Ex. Sess., pp. 1808-1909.) 
One of the major questions concerning the implemen-
tation of environmental policy occurs in 43.21c.030(2)(c): 
What constitutes "major actions significantly affecting the 
quality of the environment?", which requtre the preparation 
and submission of an environmental impact statement (EIS). 
Relevant EIS issues are: When should the EIS be prepared, that 
is, at what stage in the development process should the EIS be 
before the administrative agency?; What co_nsti tutes an "ade-
quately" prepared EIS?; and, What evidence must be submitted by 
an administrative agency in order to determine whether'~or-.i not r: "l_ 
the major action h~s no significant impact on the quality 0£ 
the environment? The court cases involving the implementation 
of SEPA, which is the subject of chapter three provide a re-
sponse to these questions. 
According to 43.21co90 the decision of the governmental 
agency is to be accorded substantial weight in EIS matters: 
In any action involving an attack on a determination by 
a governmental agency relative to the requirement or 
the absence of the requriement, or the adequacy of a "de-
tailed sraatement", the decision of the government agen-
cy shall be accorded substantial weight. 
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The legislature apparently intended to defer judgement to the 
branch with "expertise" in EIS matters. Also, as a practical 
consideration, such a deferment would reduce the number of "ad-
ministrative" cases appearing before the judiciary. 
The time limitation for commencing a challenge to govern-
mental action on grounds of noncompliance with the provisions of 
SEPA must be commenced within sixty days for private party pro-
jects, or ninety days for projects to be performed by a govern-
mental agency or to be performed under government contract. 
Date of commencement begins with the filing of the notice with 
the department of ecology (DOE), the date of final newspaper 
publication, or date of mailing, whichever is later. It should 
l)e noted that: 
Any subsequent action of the acting governmental agen-
cy for which the regulations of the acting governmental 
agency permit the same detailed statement to be uti-
lized and as long as there is no substantial change in 
the project between the time of the action and any such 
subsequent ac~ion, shall not be set aside, enjoined, re-
viewed, or thereafter challenged on the grounds of non-
compliance with RC W 4J.21c.OJ0(2)(c).7 
The legislative intent appears to be a desire to avoid, or at 
least, mit i gate, bureaucratic redundancy in the preparation of 
EISs. Determinations of whether or not a "substantial change" 
in the project has occured as those involving whether or not a 
"major action significantly affects the quality of the environ-
ment" are usually made by the administrative agency. - Of course 
if the determination is contested and brought before the court, 
the judiciary has the final work on the matter. 
In brief, SEPA is an environmental full disclosure sta-
14 
tute, requiring all agencies of the state to consider environ-
mental values in their decision making and subsequenct actions. 
SEPA created a Council on Environmental Policy (CEP) whose 
primary responsibility was to "adopt initially and amend there-
after rules of interpretation and implementation" of the Act. 8 
CEP was given rule making powers for the purpose of providing 
guidelines to all branches of goverrunent. Those guidelines are 
discussed in the next chapter. 
Shoreline Management Act of 1971 (SMA) 
SMA is the legislature's recognition that the shorelines 
of the state are among its most valuable and fragile of natural 
resources. Mounting pressures of competing uses for the shore-
lines has necessitated a concomitant increase in the coordination 
of management and development of the shorelines of the state. 
The legislature further finds: 
T).hat much of the shorelines of t~e state and the up-
lands adjacent thereto are in private ownership; that 
unrestricted conatruction on the privately owned or 
publicly owned shorelines of the state is not in the 
best vublic interestJ and therefore, coordinated plan-
ning is necessary in order to protect the public in-
terest associated with the shorelines of the state 
while, at the same time, recognizing and protecting 
private property rights consistent with the public 
interest. There is, therefor, a clear and urgent de-
mand for a planned, rational, and concerted effort, 
jointly performed by federal, state, and local govern-
ments, to prevent the inherent harm in an uncoordina-
ted and piecemeal development of the state's shore-
lines. 9 
SMA established statutory support for coordinated planning and 
management between the state and local governments in order to 
protect the public interest associated with the shorelines of 
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the state. Unlike the provisions in SEPA, SMA expresses legisla-
tive acknowledgement of the potential conflict between private 
property interests and the public interest. The res·olution of 
this possible conflict in the use of shoreline~, is to come a-
bout through coordinated governmental planning. 
While SEPA emphasizes the consequences of governmental 
decision making on the environment, SMA focuses attention on the 
management and development aspects of planning. SMA is a more 
"use" oriented statute than SEPA. Development in SMA means 
"a use consisting of the construction or alteration of sturc-
tures • . • or any project of a permanent nature which materi-
ally interferes with the normal public use of the water or shore-
lines of the state."10 
The legislative intent expressed in SMA is to provide 
for the management of the shorelines "• .• by planning for and 
fostering all reasonable and appropriate uses. • • and by pro-
tecting against adverse effects to the public health, the land 
and its vegetat-ion and wiJ.dlife ... 11 
The legislature provides an ordering of preferential 
uses which DOE is to adopt in establishing "shorelines of state-
wide significance )designated by the legislature and by statu-
. _. 
tory procedural requirement), and which the local government is 
to adopt in developing its master program. The master program 
is the comprehensive use plan for a described area. The ordering 
of preferential uses which are to be reflected in the implemen-
tation programs of DOE and local government indicate that en-
vironmental consideration are given priority over economic ones. 
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Preferential uses are those which: 
(1) Recognize and protect the state-wide interest 
over local interest; (2) Preserve the natural character of the shoreline; 
(3) Result in long term over short term benefits; 
(4) Protect the resource and ecology of the shore-
line; (5) Increase public access to publicly owned areas 
of the shorelines; (6) Increase recreational opportunities for the public 
in the s~~reline; 
. . . 
The legislative intent of land use planning is to en-
courage those uses which are not dependent upon the shorelines 
of the state to move inland. In this way, SMA policy seeks to 
mitigate the intensive demand for the shorelines of the state, 
pertaining to development, so as to allow maximum access to 
shorelines by t he people of the .~ state. The legislature is ex-
plicit in promoting a regulatory system which attempts to keep 
the shorelines free of non-dependent uses: 
In the implementation of this policy the public's 
opportunity to enjoy the physical and aesthetic quali-
ties of natural shorelines of the state shall be pre-
served to the greatest extent feasible consistent with 
the overall best interest of the state and the people 
generally. To this end uses shall be prefEfr-red. which 
are consistent with control of pollution and prevention 
of damage to the natural environment, or are unique to 
or dependent upon the use of the state's shoreline ••• 
Permitted uses in the shorelines of the state shall be 
designed and conducted in a manner to minimize, insofar 
as practical, any resultant damage to the ecology and 
environment of the shoreline area and any interference 
with the public's use of the water.13 
The public's interest in the access to, and use of, the shore-
lines, is t he subject of legislative intent in SMA. Even in 
the provisions of the master program which allow for the vary-
ing of the application of use regulations of the program, the 
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consideration of the public interest is promoted: "Any such 
varying shall be allowed only if extraordinary circumstances 
are shown and the public 'interest suffers no substantial detri-
mental effect. 1114 The question of what constitutes a substan-
tial detrimental effect is not further defined. In light of 
SEPA, it may be assumed that a "varying action" which did not 
have a substantial detrimental effect would require a negative 
delcaration of significance (Washington Administrative Code (WAC) 
197-10-.340 "Threshold Determination Procedures", discussed in 
chapter two in more detail). 
The administration of the development permit system to 
manage shoreline use, "shall be performed exclusively by local 
government ... 15 Sec. 90.58.180(1) provides that a person aggrieved 
by an order of the local government concerning the granting or de-
nying of a development permit may obtain a review in the super-
ior court. The DOE or the attorney general may obtain review of 
any final order granting a permit, or granting or denying an ap-
plication for a permit issued by a local government.16 Whereas 
SEPA made no provision for court review, SMA makes it explicit 
that all aspects of the regulatory system shall be reviewable 
by the court 1 "Rules, re·gulations, designations, master pro-
grams, and guidelines shall be subject to review in superior 
court. 111 7 
A vigorous application of SMA is intended by the legisla-
ture in its direction to the courts to give the Act a liberal 
construal: "This chapter is exempted from the rule of strict 
construction, and it shall be liberally construed to give full 
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effect to the objectives and purposes for which it was enacted. 1118 
The overall intent of SMA is to recognize that coordina-
ted, rational planning can prevent the "inherent harm in an un-
coordinated and piecemeal development " of the state's shore-
lines. 
Environmental Coordination Procedures Act of 1973 (ECPA) 
The primary legislative intent of ECPA is twofold: (1 ) 
Reduce the numerous permi ts and related documents required for 
project approval from state and local agencies; and (2) Pro-
vide the public with a better access in expressing its views in 
relation to applications to state and local agencies. The legi-
slative purposes of ECPA are provided below and they -ar e · to be 
considered the criteria for evaluating the effectivness of the 
suggested coordinative scheme posited in chapter four. The pur-
poses of ECPA are to: 
(a) Provide for an optional procedure to assist those 
who, in the course of satisfying the requirement s of 
state government prior to undertaking a project which 
contemplates the use of the state's air, land, or water 
resources, must obtain a number of permits, from the de-
partment of ecology and one or more state or local agen-
cies by establishing a mechanism in state government 
which will coordinate administrative decision-making 
procedures. • • pertaining to such documents. 
(b) Provide to members of the public a better and 
easier opportunity to present their views comprehen-
sively on proposed uses of natural resource and related 
environmental matters prior to the making of decisions •.. 
(c) Provide to members of the public who desire to car-
ry out •.• projects within the state of Washington a 
greater degree of certainty in terms of permit require-
ments of state and local government. 
(d) Provide better coordination and understanding be-
tween state and local agencies in the administration of 
the various programs relating to air, water, and land re-
sources. 
• • .19 
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It must be under scored that ECPA is an optional procedure, and 
as such, lacks the force as contained in SEPA and SMA. 
The optional nature of ECPA is again indicated in 90.62-
.404( 1): '~ Any person proposing a project may submit a master ap-
plication to the department [poE] requesting the issuance of all 
permits necessary prior to the construction and operation of 
the project in the state of Washington." 
ECPA is a state permit system, where permit is "any li-: 
cense, permit, certificate, certification·, approval, commpliance . 
schedule, or other similar document pertaining to any regulatory 
or management program"20 which contemplates the use of the state's 
resources, that is required to be obtained prior to constriic-
ting or operating a project. SMA has a bearing on ECPA as permit 
also means a substantial development permit under SMA, and "any 
permit, required by a local goverrunent for a project, that th~ 
local government has chosen to process pursuant to SMA. 11 21 
Project under ECPA is "any new activity or any expansion of or 
addition to an existing activity, fixed in location."22 
ECPA has provisionrs "f.orsapublic hearing where the appli-
cant may submit "any relevant information and material in support 
of his applications, and members of the public may present rele-
vant views and supporting materials in relation to any or all of 
the applications being considered ... 23 
As of this writing, there is no corpus of case law un-
der ECPA but the act does provide that the "pollution control 
hearings board" is authorized to review decisions· issued by 
DOE except 'when:., a substantial developrrrent permit is under con-
20 
sideration, where the shorelines hearings board created under 
SMA, RCW 90.58 ,.170, has authority for review. Administrative 
review under ECPA is confined to the restrictive standards for 
judicial review as set out by the Administrative Procedures Act 
(APA) RCW 34.04.130(5), and neither Board . has power to review the 
facts de novo because APA sec. 130(5) limits review to the record 
below, except in cases of procedural irregularity. Judicial re-
view under ECPA is governed by APA in contested cases and limits 
the reviewing body's discretion to the reversal of the admini-
strative decision if, inter alia, it is "unsupported by material 
and substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submit-
ted; or . . . arbitrary and capricious."24 
The guidelines governing the master· application procedure 
will be presented in the next chapter. But the optional nature 
of ECPA is the biggest obstacle in the act actually functioning 
as a coordinative mechanism. The potential for an effective 
permit process system has been established by the legislature. 
Considered together, SEPA, SMA, and ECPA provide the 
necessary statutory framework in which the proposaJsfor develop-
ment can be channeled through a structure of environmental law. 
The administrative implementation aspect of environmental manage-
ment is the subject of the next chapter. 
CHAPTER TWO 
ADMI NISTRATI VE IMPLEMENTATION 
The purpose of administrative implementation is to carry 
out the intent of the legislature as the administrative agency 
has been so authorized to do. I n providing the legal means of 
carrying out the intent of the legislative branch of govern-
ment, it becomes necessary for the administrative branch to 
establish a system of guidelines interpreting and implementing 
the legislative act. 
Guidelines Interpreting and Implementing SEPA 
In 1974; the Washington State Legislature established 
a new agency, the Council on Environmental Policy (CEP), and 
charged it with the responsibility for adopting "rules of in-
terpretation and implementation" of SEPA. After extensive 
drafting and public hearings, CEP adopted final SEPA guidelines 
on December 12, 1975. These guidelines became effective Janu-
ary 15, 1976. 
As directed by the Legislature, CEP ceased to exist and 
its duties were transferred to the Department of Ecology (DOE) 
I 
on July 1, 1976. After many petitions for change and several 
meetings and public hearings; DOE adopted guidelines amendments 
in December, 1977. These became effective on January 21,1978. 1 
The pertinent issues concerning the implementation of 
SEPA and the guidelines are: authority to establish guidel ines, 
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purpose, scope , and coverage, definitions of action where the 
preparation of an EIS might be involved, timing of the EIS pro-
cess, scope of a proposal and·-·relation to EIS, threshold deter-
mination, EIS preparation responsibility, and the major ele-
ments of a draft EIS. This section will end with a discussion 
of the rules of judicial review applicable to the implementation 
of SEPA. 
The authority to promulgate SEPA guidelines was granted 
in RCW 43.21c.110, in which the legislature stated that it would 
be the duty of the Council "To adopt initially and amend there-
after rules of interpretation and implementation." 
The purpose of the guidelines is twofold• (1) To es-
tablish guidelines interpreting and impoementing SEPA. Each 
state and local agency of government must adopt its own rules, 
ordinances or resulutions consistent with Chapter 197-10 Wash-
ington Administrative Code (WAC), "Guidelines Interpreting and 
Implementing the State Environmental Policy Act". And (2) To 
establish methods and means of implementing SEPA in a manner 
which reduces duplicative and wasteful practices, es~ablishes 
effective and uniform procedures, encourages public involvement, 
and promotes certainty with respect to the requirements of the 
act. 2 (Note the similarity in language with the purpose of ECPA.) 
The guidelines are important in a legal sense in that 
compliance with the guidelines of Chapter 197-10 WAC and agency 
guidelines consistent therewith, "shall constitute complete pro-
cedural compliance with SEPA for any 'action' as defined in WAC 
197-10-040(2)." Thus, the guidelines are used by the court in 
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the judicial review of actions relating to the implementation of 
SEPA. 
According to WAC 197-10-040(2), "action" means: 
(2) [Al n activity potentially subject to the environ-
mental impact statement requirements of RCW 4J.21C.OJ0-
(2) (c) and (2)(d) ••• All actions fall within one of 
the following categories: 
(a) Governmental licensing of activities involving mo-
dification of the physical environment. 
(b) Governmental action of a project nature. This in-
cludes and is limited to: 
(i) the decision by an agency to undertake any activi-
ty which will directly modify the physical environment, 
whether such activity will be undertaken directly by the 
agency or through contract with another, and 
(ii) the decision to purchase, sell, lease, transfer 
or exchange natural resources, including publicly owned 
land, whether or not the environment is directly modi-
fied. 
(c) Governmental action of a nonproject nature. This 
includes and is limited to: 
(i) the adoption or amendment of legislation, ordi-
nances, rule s or regulations which contain standards con-
tolling use or modification of the physical environment; 
(ii) the adoption or amendment of comprehensive land 
use plans or zoning ordinances; 
(iii) the adoption of any policy, plan or program 
which will govern the development of a series of func~ ~ 
tionally related major actions, but not including any 
policy, plan or program for which approval must be ob-
tained from any federal agency prior to implementation; 
(iv) creation of, or annexations to, any city, town, 
or district; 
(v) adoptions or approval of ut i lity , transportation 
and solid waste disposal rates; 
(vi) capital budgets; and 
(vii) road, street and highway plans. 
As is evident, the extent of governmental activity which is sub-
ject to the provisions of SEPA is indeed expansive. While the 
listing of "categorical exemptions" in WAC 197-10-170 are too 
numerous to mention, it should be noted that (6) under said sec-
tion exempts the "activities of the legislature. All action of 
the state legislature are hereby exempteds Provided, That this 
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subsection shall not be construed to exempt t he propos i ng of 
legislation by any agency." 
The guidelines defining "action", it should be empha-
sized, became effective subsequent to the court cases discussed 
in chapter three. As is clear in that discussion, many of the 
questions concerning what constitutes an "action" have been re-
solved in the most recent set of guidelines. This is in keeping 
with the purpose of the guidelines, promoting "certainty with 
respect to the requirements of the act." 
The timing of the EIS process is an essential element of 
the guidelines. The vigorous application of SEPA is dependent 
upon the consideration of environmental values, and the EIS re-
presents the principal means of identifying and examining those 
values. WAC 197-10-055 states: 
(1) The primary purpose of the EIS process is to pro-
vide environmental information to governmental decision-
makers to be considered prior to making their decision. 
The process should thus be completed before the decisions 
of an agency commit it to a particular course of action. 
The actual decision to proceed with many actions may in-
volve a series of individual approvals or decisions. 
The threshold determination and the EIS, if required, 
should ideally be completed at the beginning of the 
process. In many cases, however preliminary decisions 
must be made upon a proposal before the proposal is suf-
ficiently definite to permit meaningful environmental 
analysis. All agencies shall identify the times at 
whieh the EIS process must be completed either in their 
guidelines or ·on a case by base basis. The lead agency 
should require completion of the threshold determi nation 
and EIS, if required, at the earliest point in the plan-
ning and decision-making process when the principal fea-
tures of a proposal and its impacts upon the environment 
can be reliably identified. 
(2) At a minimum, the thr.eshold determination and any 
required EIS shall be completed prior to undertaking any 
proposed major action. 
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The difficulty in the EIS process is that numerous decisions 
must be made upon a proposal before there is available, ade-
quate boundaries of the impact of the project. The notion of 
when an impact upon the environment can be "reliably" :..identified 
is a judgement by the administrative agency, which is open to po-
tentially conflicting interpretations by the developer, the public, 
and the court, if the decision is contested and brought before 
the court for review. (The court has held that an administrative 
decison on the impact of a rezoning action--no EIS required--
could be changed once, at a later time, additional information 
was made available which would define the proposal with more 
clarity, see Narrowsview v. Tacoma, chapter three.) 
The scope of a proposal and how extensive an EIS must be 
in its assessment of impact is a recurring question. Often, pro-
jects have been divided up, "segmented" by those hoping to avoid 
EI S requirements. Future governmental approvals are often re- · ·· 
quired, and thus, might require an EIS, by one agency, but not 
by the lead agency. WAC 197-10-060 addresses these problems: 
(2) The total proposal is the proposed action, to-
gether with all proposed activity functionally related 
to it. Future activities are functionally related to the 
present proposal if; 
(a) The future activity is an expansion of the pre-
sent proposal, facilitates or is necessary to operation 
of the present proposal; or 
(b) The present proposal facilitates or is a neces-
sary prerequisite to future activities. 
The scope of the proposal is not limited by the juris-
diction of the lead agency. The fact that future parts 
of a proposal will require future governmental approvals 
shall not be a bar to their present consideration, so 
long as the plans for those future parts are specific 
enough to allow some evaluation of their potential en-
vironmental impacts. Acting agencies and lead agen-
cies should be alert to the possibility that a pro-
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posal may involve other agencies with jurisdiction 
which may not be taking any action until sometime in 
the future. 
(For example, in a proposal ·ror a plat approval, another agency 
with jurisdiction may be the appropriate sewer district, even 
though the sewers may not be installed until several years la-
ter.) 
Subsections 197-10-060(3) and (4) address the extent of 
EIS assessment and "segmentation" respectively: 
(3) The impacts of proposal include its direct im-
pacts as well as its reasonably anticipated indirect 
impacts. Indirect impacts are those which result from 
any activity which is induced by a proposal. These in-
clude, but are not limited to impacts resulting from 
growth induced by the proposal, or the likelihood that 
the present action will serve as a precedent for future 
actions. Contemporaneous or subsequent development of 
a similar nature, however, need not be considered in the 
threshold determination unless there will be some causal 
connection between this development and one or more of 
the governmental decisions necessary for the proposal in 
question. (4) The lead agency may divide proposals involving ex-
tensive future actions into segments, with an EIS pre-
pared for each segment. In such event, the earlier EIS 
shall describe the later segments of the proposal and 
note that future environmental analysis will be required 
for these future segments. The segmentation allowed by 
this subsection shall not be used at the threshold de-
termination stage to determine that any segment of a 
more extensive significant is insignificant ••• 
A lead agency cannot segment a proposed project in order to 
reduce its significance. A proposal is to be considered holis-
tically. Indirect impacts which should be included in an EIS 
are those which may be growth-inducing, such as the adoption of 
a zoning ordinance which will encourage or tend to cause par-
ticular types of projects. A project, such as the construction 
of a condominium, to be located in an area of single family dwel-
27 
ling, would constitute a significant change in the area. Thus, 
the adoption of a zoning ordinance allowing the project to pro-
ceed would be within the guidelines requiring the preparation of 
an EIS. 
The reamining EIS issue to be considered before a brief 
listing of the contents of the EIS is given, is the critical 
one: whether or not the proposal will result in a significant 
adverse impact upon the quality of the environment. The guide-
lines recognize that when several marg inal impacts are taken to-
gether, this could result in a significant adverse environmental 
impact.J The guidelines make it explicit that the determination 
of whether or not an EIS is required, is not merely a matter of 
w.eighing the benefits and detriments of the proposal. They are 
more expansive in their language. WAC 197-10-360(3) read: 
It $pQuld also be remembered that proposal designed 
to improve the environment (such as sewage treatment 
plants or pollution control requirements) may also 
have adverse environmental impacts . The question at 
the threshold determination level is not, whether the 
beneficial aspects of a proposal outweigh its adverse 
impacts, but rather if the proposal involves any sig-
nificant adverse impacts upon the quality 'of the en-
vironment. If it does, an EIS is required. No test 
of balance shall be applied at the threshold determina-
tion level. 
It is interesting to compare t he above language wi th that of the 
act its.elf, in which no mention is made of "adverse" impacts. 
Only if a major action significantly affected the quality of 
the environment, would an EIS be required. However, accor~ing 
to the guidelines, any significant adverse impact requires an 
EIS. I t seems in determining whether or not a proposal would 
have an adverse, rather than merely a significant, impact, 
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some weighing of benefits and detriments is necessary. 
The preparation of the EIS may be done by a private appli-
cant or his agent, or by an outside consultant retained by either 
a private applicant or the lean agency. Nevertheless, the assur-
ance that the EIS is prepared in a responsible manner and with 
appropriate methodOl.ogy is the responsibility of the official 
within the lead agency. "The responsible official shall direct 
the areas of research and examination to be undertaken, as well 
as the organization of the resulting document."4 
The two principal elements in the EIS are the summary of 
the contents and eight subelement:s which constitute the major part 
of the text. The summary if often used by agencies other than 
the lead agency as an aid in deoiit~'O.n'r.tnak.tng. If the impacts can-
not be predicted with certainty, the reason for uncertainty to~ . 
gether with the more~ likely possibilities are to be concisely 
stated.5 The summary is to include a brief description of the 
following: 
(a) The proposal, including the purpose or objectives 
which are sought to be achieVied by the sponsor. 
(b) The direct and indirect impacts upon the environ-
ment which may result from the proposal. 
(c) The alternatvies considered, together with any 
variation in impacts which may result from each alter-
native. 
(d) Measures which may be effected by the applicant, 
lead agency, or other · agency with jurisdiction to miti-
gate or eliminate adverse impacts which may result from 
the proposal • 
. (e) Any remaining adverse impacts which cannot or will 
not be mitigated.o 
. 
The eight sections which comprise the major part of the 
EIS are to describe: the name and location of the proposal: exis-
ting environmental conditions: the impact of the proposal on the 
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envirorunent; the relationship between local short-term uses of 
man's environment and maintenance and enhancement of long-term 
productivity; irreversible or irretrievable commitments of re-
sources; adverse envirorunental impacts which may be mitigated; 
alternatives to the proposal; and, unavoidable adverse impacts.? 
Generally, these sections reflect the legislative intent expressed 
in SEPA regarding how the policies of SEFA are to be implemented.8 
Rules and guidelines adopted pursuant to SEPA are to be 
in accordance to, and subject to, the scope of judicial review, 
as expressed in the Administrative Procedure Act, (APA)(RCW J4.-
o4.120 and J4.1JO. Sec. 120 reads: "Every decision and order 
adverse to a party to the proceeding, rendered by an agency in 
a contested case, shall be in writing or stated in the record 
and shall be accompanied by findings of fact and conclusion of 
law." 
Sec. 130 of the APA describes the scope of judicial re-
view which the court applies in examining administrative de-
cisions: 
(6) The court may affirm the decision of the agency 
or remand the case for further proceeding; or it may 
reverse the decision if the substantial rights of the 
petitioners may have been prejudiced because the ad-
ministrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or de-
cisions are: 
(a) in violation of constitutional provisions; or 
(b) in excess of statutory authority or jurisdiction 
of the agency; or 
(c) made upon unlawful procedure; or 
(d) affected by other error of law; or 
(e) clearly erroneous in view of the entire record as 
submitted and the public policy contained in the act of 
the legislature authorizing the decision or order; or 
(f) arbitrary or capricious. 
The "clearly erroneous" standard of review entitles the court to 
JO 
review with the most expansive la ti tu de, the decision of the agen-
cy ' involved in a contested case. The "clearly erroneous" stan-
dard can be applied when it is necessary to determine the con-
sistency between the legislative intent of the act and the means 
of implementing that intent as performed by the administrative 
agency in question. 
Guidelines Implementing SMA 
The legislature has recognized that the shorelines of the 
state are a valuable and fragile resource. Moreoever, they are 
a limited asset. They cannot be increased but there exists the 
possibility that their value will diminish without a sound . and 
comprehensive management program. 
Ther~ are three chapters of the Washington Administrative 
Code providing guidelines to carry out the intent of SMA which 
is to provide for the management of Washington's shorelines by 
planning for and fostering all reasonable and appropriate uses. 
These are: "Final Guidelines" implementing SMA, WAC 173-16: "Per-
mits for Substantial Development on Shorelines of the State", 
WAC 173-14; and, "Adoption of Designations of Wetlands Associa-
ted with Shorelines of the State:, WAC 173-22. 
As required by SMA9 the final guidelines are to: "Serve 
as standards for implementation of the policy of chapter 90.58 
RCW for regulation of uses of the shorelines; and, Provide cri-
teria to local governments and the department of ecology in de-
veloping master programs."lO The three parts of the SMA guide-
lines to be discussed are: the Master Program, the Natural Sy-
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stems, and, the Use Activities. 
The local government is to develop the master program 
in order to provide an objective guide for regulating the use of 
shorelines. The master program should indicate the local poli-
cies for the development of shorelands and state how these poli-
cies relate to the goals of the local citizens and to specific 
regulations of uses affecting the physical development of land 
and water resources throughout the local government's jurisdic-
tion. The master program is general, comprehensive, and long 
range in nature. The policies, proposals, and guidelines are 
not directed toward any specific sites and are to include all 
land and water uses, their impact on the environment, and lo-
gical estimates of future growth.11 
The local governments submit a master program to DOE; 
it "must contain a clearly expressed policy statement. The 
pol i cy statement must reflect the intent of the act, the goals 
I 
of the local citizens, and specificall y relate the shoreline 
management goals to the master program use regulations. The 
methodology for developing policy statements require local 
government to: 
(a) Obtain a broad citizen input in developing poli-
cy by involving interested citizens and all private and 
public entities having interest or responsibilities re-
lating to shorelines ••• 
(b) Analyze existing policies to identify those po-
licies that may be incorporated into the master pro-
gram and those which conflict with the intent of the 
act ••• 
(c) Formulate goals for the use of shoreline areas 
and develop policies to guide shoreland activities to 
achieve these goals.12 
Although the local governments provide their own specific 
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guidelines to reflect the varying differences of shorelines 
throughout the state, the master program guidelines require 
the inclusion of several plan elements. These are: 
(a) "Economic development element" for the location 
and design of industries, transportation facilities, port 
facilities, tourist facilities, commercial and other de-
velopments that are particularly dependent on shoreland 
locations. 
(b) "Public access elements" for assessing the need 
for providing public access to shoreline areas. 
(c) "Circulation element" for assessing to loca-
tion and extent of existing and proposed ••. trans-
portation routes and other public facilities and cor-
relating those facilities with the shoreline use ele-
ments. 
(d) "Recreational element" for the preservation and 
expansion of recreational opportunities through programs 
of acquisition, development 'and various means of less-
than-fee acquisitQon. 
(e) "Shoreline use element" for considering: 
(i) The pattern of distribution and location require-
ments of land uses on shorelines and adjacent areas, in-
cluding, but not limited to, housing, commerce, industry, 
transportation, public buildings and utilities, agri-
culture, education and natural resources. 
(ii) The pattern of distribution and location require-
ments of water uses including, but not limited to, aqua-
culture, recreation and transportation. 
(f) "Conservation element" for the preservation of the 
natural shoreline resources, considering such characteris-
tics as scenic vistas, parkways, estuarine areas for fish 
and wildlife protection, beaches and other valuable na-
tural or aesthetic features. 
( g) "Historical /cultural element" for protection and 
restoration of buildings, sites and areas havi~g histor-
ic, cultural, education or scientific values.19 
Of interest is the provision in the "economic development ele-
ment" requiring the location of developments on shoreland lo-
cations to be "particularly dependent" on shoreland locations. 
This isnor:EiSten't with the intent of SMA of allowing "alterations 
of the natural condition of the shorelines ••• when autho~ized, 
shall be given priority for ••• industrial and commercial de-
velopments which are particulariy dependent on their location 
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on or use of the shorelines."14 
The Natural Systems part of the guidelines is intended 
to provide criteria to local governments in the development of 
their master program. The natural systems categories include 
marine beaches, spits and bars, islands, estuaries, marshes, 
bogs and swamps, lakes rivers, streams and creeks, flood plains, 
Puget Sound , and the Pacific Ocean. Perhaps the natural sy-
stem subject to the most intensive of competing demands is the 
Puget Sound. 
Essentially the criteria provide a description of the 
natural system along with the reaons why it must be managed 
properly. An example of the guidelines description of "estu-· 
aries" is as follows1 
An estuary is that portion of a coastal stream influ-
enced by the tide of the marin~ waters into which it 
flows and within which the sea water is measurably di-
luted with freshwater derived from land drainage. 
Estuaries are zones of ecological transition between 
f~esh and saltwater. The coastal brackes water areas 
are rich in aquatic life. • ·• Because of their impor-
tance in the food protection chain and their natural 
beauty, the limited estuarial areas require careful 
attention in the planning function. Close scruting 
should be given to all plans for development in es-
tuaries which reduce the area of the estuary and in-
terfere with water flow. (See WAC 173-16-060(14)) 
Special attention should be given to plans for up-
stream projects which could deplete the freshwater 
supply of the estuary.15 
The holistic systems approach to shoreland planning is evident 
here. The other section referred to, deals with ."landfill" uses 
on the shorelines. In keeping with the policy of SMA, it is 
noted that most landfills destroy the natural character of the 
land, and therefore "Priority should be given to landfills for 
J4 
water-dependent uses and for public uses." 
The economic development of the central Puget Sound 
Basin has been stimulated by the fact that the Sound is one of 
the few areas in the world which provides several deepwater in-
land harbor s (Everett, Seattle, Tacoma, Bellingham). The use of 
the Puget Sound waters by deep-draft vessels is on the increase 
due to its proximity to the developing Asian countries. Too, 
the northern Puget Sound is the site of the oil docking facili-
ties receiving oil from the Alaskan North Slope (along with 
southern California). This increased trade +'B.:fu.cP docking will 
attract more industry and more people which will place more use 
pressure on the Sound in terms of recreation and the require-
ments for increased food supply. A vigorous application of 
of guidelines is essential so as to allow the shorelines of 
the state to be enjoyed by future generations. 
The Use Activities sections contains guidelines which 
represent the criteria upon which judgements for proposed shore-
line developments are to be based until the master programs have 
been completed; and, these guidelines are intended "to provide 
the basis for the development of that portion of the master pro-
gram concerned with the regulation of such uses. 11 1~ .:.·· Since ~ alr 
of the master programs have been completed the· ~se acticities 
have been incorporated into the local government's regulatory 
system. The: categories of use activities are: agricultural prac-
tices, aquaculture, forest management practices, commercial develop-
ment, marinas, mining, outdoor advertising, signs, and billboards, 
residential development, utilities, ports and water-related indus-
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try, bulkheads, breadwaters, jetties and gro i ns, landfill, solid 
waste disposal, dredging, shoreline protection, road and rai lroad 
design and construction, piers, archeological areas and historic 
areas, and recreation. In general, the use categories encourage 
protect i on of the shorelines where possible, promote public ac-
cess to shorelands, restrict where possible, development which 
is particularly dependent on the shoreline for its location and 
operat i on, and to reduce where practicable, the adverse impact 
to the environment due to development. 17 
And lastly, the guidelines mentions the variances and 
conditional use .. consideration that are to be included in the 
local master program. Any permit for a variance or a conditional 
use granted by the local government under an approved master pro-
gram must be submitted to the DOE for approval or disapproval. 
The guidelines state that the granting of variances and condi-
tional uses ''should be utilized in a manner which, while pro-
tecting the environment, will assure that a person will be able 
to utilize his property in a fair and equitable ·manner. 11 18 This 
is an attempt by the administrati'11e body to avoid the "taking 
issue" in the regulation of uses on the state's shorelands. 
The permit system for "substantial developments" on the 
shorelines is administered the local government with t.he DOE 
acting primarily in a supportive and review capacity with "pri-
mary emphasis on insuring compliance with the policies and pro-
visions of the shoreline management act . .. 19 A substantial de-
velopment is any "development which the total cost or fair mar-
ket value exceeds one thousand dollars, or any development 
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which materially interferes with the normal public use of t he 
water or shorelines of the state. • • ..20 
I n the regulation pertaining to "Permits for Substan-
tial Developments on Shorelines of the State", Sec. 173-14-100 
WAC, statESSBPA has been determined to be applicable to govern-
ment permit programs. Thus, all the SEPA guidelines previously 
mentioned in this chapter pertai n to the granting or denying of 
permits for substantial development. This is an important fact 
to bear in mind as the suggest coordinative scheme posited in 
chapter four uses SEPA's procedural process where the ' EIS is 
required as the coordinating vehicle. However, an unresolved 
question is whether the Shorelines Hearings Board, in review-
ing a SMA permit, has the authority to invalidate the permit 
on grounds of noncompliance with SEPA.21 
In the "Adoption of Designations of Wetlands Associ-
ated with Shorelines of the State" the designations are in the 
form of three volumes of maps incorporated in an appendix. Re-
levant to the section in SMA authorizing the DOE to designate 
'wetlands 1122 is the definition of "wetlands" in the Designation 
guideline, 173-22-030 WAC: 
(1) "Wetlands" or "wetland areas" means those land 
extending landward for two hundred feet in all directions 
as measured on a horizaontal plane from the ordinary h~gh­
water mark; and all marshes, bogs, swamps, flaodways, ri-
ver ·deltas and flood plains associated with the streams, 
lakes and tidal waters which _are subject to the provi-
sions of chapter 90.58 RCW. 
(2) "Associated wetlands" means those wetlands which 
are strongly influenced by and in close proximit¥ to any 
stream, river, lake, or tidal water, or combination there-
of, subject to chapter 90.58 RCW. 
~f the map designations conflict with the criteria, the latter 
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control (WAC 173-22-055(1973). Generally the court will defer 
to the judgement of DOE in interpretative matters, as it is the 
administrative agency with the technical expertise needed to de-
signate wetlands and associated wetlands. 
Master Application Procedu+es (ECPA) 
All ECPA master applications are processed through · the ad-
ministrative headquarters located at DOE in Olympia, the state 
capitol. The master application center is operated by DOE inde-
pendently of the department's other programs and administrative 
offices. pursuant to Chapter 173-08 WAC. 
When the center receives a completed master application 
form, the center forwards copies to all participating agencies .. 
(those involved in processing permits pursuant to the procedures 
of EPCA). At the same time, the center sends a certification · 
form to the local government where the proposed activity is to 
occur. Th~ certification form is to indicate one of the following: 
(i) The proposal complies with all zoning ordinances 
and associated comprehensive plans and relevant policies 
administered by the local government relating to the lo-
cation of the proposal. Therefore, certification is is-
sueds 
(ii) Local government has no applicable zoning ordi-
nances or comprehensive plans and relevant policies in 
effect for the subject area. Therefore, certification 
is issued; 
(iii) The proposal does not comply with either local 
governments zoning ordinances, associated comprehensive 
plans or relenat policies in effect for the subject area. 
Local government elects to process according to this chap-
ter the necessary to certify this proposal• 
(iv) The proposal does not comply with either local 
governments zoning ordinances, associated comprehensive 
plans or relevant policies in effect for the subject 
area. Local government does not elect to process accor-
ding to this chapter the permits necessary to certify 22 this proposal. Therefore, certification is not issued 
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As indicated in (iii) above, the local government ~ecomes a par-
ticipating agency in the permit process only if the proposal does 
not comply with the required stipulations. No environmental 
assessment (under SEPA) is required by ECPA before the local 
government makes a determination an the proposal. This is im-
portant, since the local government's decision not to issue the 
certification will terminate the application procedure.23 
A participating state agency is required to send the 
center a statement indicating whether or not it has an interest 
in the proposal, pertaining tos 
permits, juriso~ctions, or interests including any in-
formation and data needed in addition to that provided 
in the application; 
val~~)i~h~~~:rd~~i~~tt~eP~~!~~l~e~~~~Icw~~~~r::t~~4 
A participating state agency would have a better opportunity 
of assessing the public interest, as well as jurisdiction boun-
daries, if an environmental assessment of the project were 
available. 
During this time the center is also to "carefully evalu-
ate the project's scope and all interests involved, including 
overall public interest, to determine if a public hearing is 
needed." 25 
Once the center receives the requested\ · information from 
participating agencies, it sends this to the applicant and veri-
fies compliance with SEPA. If this is not already accomplished, 
the center sends an environmental checklist to the applicant for 
completion. After receiving the applications, and, if needed, 
the environmental checklist, the center forwards these to the 
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participating agencies and identifies the SEPA lead agency 
(pursuant to WAC 197-10-230(6)) and notifies the agencies of 
this.26 
Timing considerations of SEPA--predraft consulation re-
quests (if requested by the applicant), preparing the draft en-
vironmental impact statement (if required), and scheduling re-
quirements of local boards, commission and councils--are re-
quired tQ!.b coordinated with the publication of notice of the 
master application.27 
The need for a public hearing is determined by the cen-
ter, or any agency reviewing a given master application , after 
considering overallpublic interest. An agency under t he ECPA 
application process can be "any local government when said gov-
ernment is acting in its capacity as a decision maker on an appli-
cation for a substantial development permit pursuant to RCW 90.-
58.140.1128 If ·the permit application did not involve a substan-
tial development permit (under SMA), it appears the local govern-
ment does not have a voice in determining whether or not consider-
ation of the overall public interest warrants the need for a pub-
lic hearing. 
If a public hearing , ~s to be 
, . , . . (., - ' .. . 
the d~aft EIS review- period when an 
held, i~ is to coincide witb 
- J , . l ... ..... ' :- .. 
• 1 ( 
af~irmat'¥e ihresnQ a· deter-
. ' minati~n° i. s ad. ~ ' byr ;the 1 17ad 1 a~~ncy1• • ! At~}}~ pub~i , h ' a~lng the 
' ' ' I ) ' 1 appi ~cant may Jsubmit ladditional ~nform~~~~n J ~o ~uppqrt hi~ . ap- ) 
. . ') ,.. ~ 
plication. · "Members of the public may present t relevant views 
and supporting materials in relation to any or all of the appli-
cations being considered and any SEPA related documents including 
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a draft EIS. 1129 Also representatives of the participating agen-
cies "may present agency views, information, and supporting ma-
terials which are relevant to the application under their juris-
dictions. "30 The public hearing may be divided into two parts 
if the hearings officer determines that the project is of a 
large and complex nature. The initial public hearing would be 
heild to inform the public of the general "intent and impact of 
the project 11 31; and after written comments had been submitted to 
the hearings officer, a second public hearing would "inform the 
public of the tentative decisions of the participating agencies."32 
After the public hearing(s) the center sends copies of 
the complete record to the participating agencies and requests 
a final decision as determined by consultation between the cen-
ter and the agency representatives. If a public hearing is not 
held, the center waits twenty days "from the date of last publi-
cation of the notice for public comment, and then forwarc(sJ the 
record to participating agencies ... 33 
Final decisions by the participating agencies must in-
elude the basis for the conclusion reached, as well as whether 
they approve or deny the perrnit,and any conditions of approval. 
A party desiring to review a final decision of a substan-
tial development permit must file the request with .'. the shorelines 
hearings board, within thir~y days. A review of a final decision 
other than the substantial development permit must be filed by ·; 
the requesting party with the pollution control hearings board 
within the same time limit, A request to review final decisions 
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involving both a substantial development permi t and any other 
state permi t(s) will resµlt in a single staged heari ng held by 
the joint boards.34 Any hearing held under ECPA by the "shore-
lines heari ngs board or t he pollution control hearings board or 
by the boar ds jointly, shall be a de novo quasi-judicial hear-
ing.1135 This means that the judgement given in the original 
hearing is suspended and the de novo hearing proceeds as if the 
case originated before the board. No attention to the findings 
and judgement rendered in the initial hearing is considered ex-
cept as it may be helpful in the reasoning.36 
In summary, EC PA does provide a legal framework to 
coordinate and channel proposals for development through an 
administrative permit system. However, there are some major 
de f ects in the master application procedure. The developer, 
not the public nor the administrative agencies, has the option 
of using ECPA. Local government should be accorded equal status 
with state agencies in all proposals for development. Thus, it 
would have a voice in deciding whether or not a public hearing 
should be held. Local government seems best suited for assessing 
the overall public interest concerning the specific proposal for 
development under consideration in the master application proce-
dure. With the current timing requirements of ECPA, the appli-
cant could proceed with the development after receiving an ap-
proval in the final dec i sion and still be subject to litiga-
tion on grounds t hat he did not fully comply with SEPA. If 
after the public hearing, or if one was not held, after proper 
notice' a waiting p~riod· - of. siX:ty . days was initiated,· a pa:f.ty 
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could not begin an action to "set aside, enjoin, review, or 
otherwise challenge ,,37 the decision on the grou'nds that the 
provisions of SEPA were fully complied with. 
We will return to ECPA in chapter four when developing 
the coordinative scheme. But due to the optional nature of 
ECPA, there is no corpus of case law associated wi th~. this 
act. 
CHAPTER THREE 
JUDI CIAL INTERPRETATIO N 
The corpus of case law which has evolved from the imple-
mentation of SEPA and SMA provides a description of the legal 
parameter of environmental management in Washington. A descip-
tion and analysis of the legal parameter will also serve to estab-
1 ish a guide in developing the coordinative scheme undertakenin 
the next chapter. Essentially the corpus of caselaw represents 
the resolution of conflicts encompassing the actions and claims 
of the major parties affected when development is channeled 
through environmental law: the developer, the public, and the ad-
ministrative body. 
In the process of judicial interpretation, the legisla-
tive intent and the administrative guidelines formulated to car-
ry out that intent, are given substance through the compelling 
force of law. This corpus of case law is the foundation upon 
which the legal system of environmental management is built. In 
order to discern the evaluation of judicial thought, and thus, 
examine how the legal system of environmental law has been con-
structed, it is useful to present the cases chronologically. 
Generally, the facts of the case at hand are presented first, 
followed by a discussion of the pertinent issues, and finally, 
the opinions of the court are presented. 
In a management context, two issues should be kept in 
4J 
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mind relating to the administration of environmental law: (1) 
What evidence should be considered, and when, by the admini-
strative agency in making its aecision? and, (2) Is that de-
cision and subsequent administrative action, a proper exer-
cise of its authority--is it in fact, legal? 
In describing the legal ambit of environmental manage-
ment issues (such as, when is a major action "significant"?), 
it is necessary (besides discussing the holding of the court 
and subsequent action) to discuss questions of law and questions 
of fact. The distinction between the two is not always clear, 
however the Supreme Court of Washington perspective on these 
questions was expressed by the Federal Supreme Court in NLRB 
v. Marcus Trucking Co. 1 in which Judge Friendly quoted Profes-
sor Jaffe's definition of a finding of fact: ~·A finding of 
fact is the assertion that a phenomenon has happened or is or 
will be happening independent of or anterior to any assertion 
to its legal effect.'" The Supreme Court of Washington in 
referring to this distinction in~.the Leschi 2 cases stated: 
"This view has long been a part of the common law of this 
state." 
A comprehensive description of the legal ambit thus 
includes a consideration of: findings of fact, environmental 
management issues, questions of law and questions of fact, and, 
the court opinion and remedy rendered by the court. 
The case of Stempel v. Department of Water Resources3 is 
the first one to be brought before the Supreme Court under SEPA. 
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A water appropriation application was filed by the Loon Lake 
Park Company, the intervenor-respondent. When a notice of 
application was published, objections were received by the 
DOE including those of the respondents Stempel (and Luiten). 
The protesters were concerned with numerous pollution and health 
problems they foresaw as imminent if further water was with-
drawn from the lake. (D. of Wat. Res. replaced by DOE, SEPA) 
Regarding the application of SEPA, the DOE asserted 
that whatever pollution, sanitation, sewage, or health diffi-
culties which may arise because of the water use permit is-
suance, there exist other departments with legislative author-
ity to respond to the problems. 
Is a state agency required to comply with the provisions 
of SEPA, if it has begun deliberation on a proposal but has not 
yet reached a final decision? Is an administrative agency ex-
empt from the procedural requirements of SEPA if other agencies 
could respond to the problems involved~ 
The court concluded that the department's action of ap-
prbving a water appropriation application, was not finalized 
prior to the effective date of SEPA and that the department is 
obligated to incorporate certain provisions of SEPA into its 
determination in this case. The court found that the enact-
ment of SEPA declares a legislative mandate of the ecological 
ethic. The court finds that "environmental protection has 
thus become a mandate to every state and local agency and de-
partment. Consideration of environmental values is advanced 
under SEPA."4 The court also states: 
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We recognize SEPA does not demand any particular sub-
stantive result in gavernme:a:tal:1decision making for it 
indicates "other considerations of state policy" con-
tinue to be the responsibility of the agencies. "En-
vironmental amenities" will undoubtedly often conflict 
with economic and technical considerations. In essence, 
what SEPA requir.es, is that the presently unquantified 
environmental amenities and values will be given ap-
propriate consideration in decision making along with 
economic and technical considerations. It is an attempt 
by the people to shape tgeir future environment by de-
liberatiop, not default. 
The court remanded the matter to the DOE for further 
action in accordance with the ~ decision. 
The Stempel case underscores the intent of the legisa-
ture by ensuring that the consideration of environmental values 
is the responsibility of all state and local agencies a~d de-
partments. The judicial interpretation of SEP~'s philosophy, 
"deliberation not default" provides a framework in which the 
court views administrative deicsion making regarding environ-
mental management issues. 
Both SEPA and SMA are involved in Merkel v. Port of 
Brownsville.6 The Port, the defendant, was engaged in the re-
development of a small boat marina along Burke Bay. The pro-
ject consists of constructing protected moorage facilities for 
recreational boasts at Brownsville on Puget Sound. The cutting 
and clearing of timber in an adjacent upland area was being car-
ried out by the Port. The plaintiff, Merkel, commenced action 
to enjoin any further cutting and clearing of timber by the 
Port until it had obtained a substantial development permit as 
required by SMA. The plaintiff further alleged the provisions 
of SEPA applied because the project was a "major action sig-
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nificantly affecting the quality of the environment." 
The Superior Court, the trial court, found the impact 
statement filed by the Port was deficient in that the Port had 
failed to consult with and obtain comments from local, state, 
and federal agencies having jurisdiction over any portion of the 
project. The court also found that the uplands development con-
stituted a "major action significantly affecting the quality of 
the environment " . The court modified an existing restraining 
order by limiting its appl ication to the wetlands only, and by 
removing the upland portion of the project from further restraint. 
At this point, the petitioners in the case, DOE and the attorney 
general, instituted the action for a writ of review and stay of 
proceedings. At issue, was whether or not the development by the 
Port was so interrelated and interdependent, that both SEPA and 
SMA had to fully complied wi th. 
The Court of Appeals found that the local government is 
responsible for the permit system of SMA which controls develop-
ment on the shorelines of the state. The court states: 
At the very least, the legislative scheme of SMA con-
templates a systematic and intelligent management of 
the shorelines. Emphasis is placed upon a cooperative 
and unified effort by all government agencies to achieve 
a use policy consistent with the provisions of the act. 
It is also clear that lands adjacent to shorelines must 
also be taken into consideration if the consistency 
stressed in the act is to be achieved.7 
It was the Port's contention that references in SMA to 
lands adjacent to the shoreline constitute nothing more than an 
admonition to the local government to adhere to the policies of 
the act in drafting guidelines for shorelines within their juris-
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diction. The court did not accept the Port's argument finding 
that there was nothing in the record to indicate that the pro-
posed construction was ever anything but one project. The Port 
could not disassociate the uplands from the shorelines in order 
to frustrate the intent of SMA. At issue . was whether the Port 
could take a single project and divide it into segments for pur-
poses of SEPA and SMA approval. Separating the uplands from the 
shorelines would not only frustrate the intent of SMA, but such 
a segmenting would reduce the "significance" of the environ-
mental impacts. The court states:"The frustrating effect of 
such piecemeal administrative approvals upon the vitality of 
these acts compels us to move in the negative."8 To permit 
piecemeal development, noted the court, would result in "frus-
tration rather than fulfillment" of the legislative intent in-
herent in the acts. 
The Court of Appeals held that in light of the interrela-
tionship of effects of the proposed redevelopment upon wetlands 
and upon adjacent uplands areas, the Port, once having complied 
with provisions of SEPA by filing a revised EIS , was not free to 
proceed cutting trees and clearing the uplands areas without re-
gard to whether or not permits required by SMA had been issued. 
The writ of review was granted and the Superior Court .. henc.e l 
was directed to reinstate the restraints previously imposed up-
on the clearing of the uplands area portion of the project. This 
is important in the recognition that it is the function of the 
courts to ensure compliance with the procedures specified in 
SEPA and SMA. Also, the courts will not allow a development to 
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be segmented in order to frustrate the full implementation of 
the acts. 
In Juanita Bay Vally Community Assoc. v. City of Kirk-
land, 9 the Kirkland City Council approved the issuance of a 
grading permit to the Kirkland Sand & Gravel Company, which 
planned to convert the gravel pit, which it owned, to an in-
dustrial park. There is a stream, 35-45 feet above the eleva-
tion of Lake Washington (shoreline of state-wide significance), 
which flows across the property in question. The proper~y is 
located J/4 to 1 mile east of the high water mark of the sur-
face of Lake Washington. 
The Association, the plaintiff, sought to halt grading, 
excavating, and filling activity pursuant to the grading per-
mit. The Superior Court denied their writ of mandamus and an-
cillary relief and the Association appealed. 
Major issues of the case concerned both SEPA and SMA: 
Are the procedural requirements of SEPA applicable to a muni-
cipal corporation, City of Kirkland?; Is an EIS required in the 
issuance of a grading permit, and if so when?; Is the marsh-
land adjacent to the stream an "associated wetland" within the 
meaning of SMA, such that a permit from the proper governmental 
authority must be obtained before any activity can be initiated? 
Kirkland Sand & Gravel, and the City, the defendant ar-
gued that: (1) the strict procedural requirements of SEPA do not 
apply to the issuance of the grading permit; or (2) if they do, 
the facts as determined by the trial court make it clear an EIS 
was not necessary. The Court of Appeals notes that the EIS is 
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particularly important because: 
It documents the extent to which the particular agency 
has complied with other procedural and substantive pro-
visions of SEPA1 it reflects the administrati~e record; 
and it is the basis upon which the responsible agency 
and officials can make the balancing judgment manda-
ted by SEPA between the benefits to be gained by the 
proposed "major action" and its impact on the environ-
ment .10 
Kirkland Sand & Gravel and the City contend that the act 
of issuing a grading permit cannot constitute a "major action" 
unless it is a legislative action involving the exercise of dis-
cretion. The action taken by the City, the maintain, was ad-
ministrative only, involving no discretion. They argue that the 
preparation of an EIS prior to the issuance of the grading permit 
would serve no useful purpose because the city council had no 
discretion to deny the application for the grading permit once 
the requirements established by the building department had been 
met. The court notes that the building code requires the City 
building official to make numerous judgements as to the type and 
extent of data to be prepared by the application. The grading 
plan, argues the Association, itself lists 11 conditions, each 
of which represents an administrative judgement by the City per-
taining to environmental factors. 
The court noted that, although the trial court deter-
mined that the issuance of the grading permit did not consti-
tute a "major action significantly affecting the quality of the 
environment", there was no showing that the responsible branch 
of state government, the City, made such a determination. The 
court agrees with the Association, in that regardless of whether 
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the City characterizes its action in issuing the grading permit 
as ministerial or discretionary, such characterization cannot 
def eat the express mandate of the legislature requiring the 
City to carry out the procedural steps of SEPA. Thus, with the 
enactment of SEPA, all formerely considered ministerial actions 
become discretionary. The court also agrees with the Associa-
tion's assertion that the grading permit and excavating project 
authorized by the issuance of the permit constitutes a threshold 
act in the implementation of the Company's plan for an industrial 
park development. The court held SEPA requires that an EIS be 
prepared prior to the first government authorization of any part 
of a project or series of project, which, when consider cumula-
tively, constitute a major action significantly affecting the 
environment. The court also held that SEPA is an "action for-
cing" enactment. SEPA, in requiring the consideration of en-
vironmental values before a decision is made whether or not an 
EIS must be prepared, also requires that a decision not to pre-
pare an EIS be based upon a determination that the proposed pro-
ject is not a major action. As the court states it: 
Before the court may uphold a decisi:on of whether or 
not a branch of State government decides to prepare an 
EIS, the appropriate governing body must be able to de-
monstrate that environmental factors were considered in 
a manner sufficient to amount to prima facie compliance 
with the procedural requirements of SEPA.11 
The court remanded the cases to the City for its determination 
of whether it is necessary to prepare an EIS before making a 
decision on the question of whether or not to issue the Gravel 
Company a grading permit. 
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Regarding the Association's assertion t hat the marshland 
area adjacent to the stream is an "associated wetland" within the 
meaning of SMA , the court found the DOE had adopted WAC Chapter 
173-22, which includes a series of maps designating "associated 
wetland" throu ghout the state and which does not include the 
marshland in question. The court concluded that the trial court 
had correctly determined the property in question to be outside 
the scope of SMA . 
In the case of Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke 
Associates, Inc., Roanoke, the defendants, purchased lots in Ro-
anoke Bay of Lake Union, which already contained a boat marina 
comprising 60 covered boat moorages and a boat sales and repair 
s hop. The Roanoke applied to the City of Seattle for a build-
ing permit to construct a condominium in 1967. This building 
permit and another one were granted before SEPA became effective. 
The third building permit was granted after SEPA became effec-
tive. The plai ntiffs, Eastlake, upon the granting of the third 
building permit, brought action against the developer--Roanoke--
the City, and the City superintendent of buildings, to enjoin 
construction of the condominium apartment on the lakeshore. 
The case involves: Whether or not the granting of a 
third renewal of a building permit required the preparation 
of an EIS? · and, Whether Roanoke ···was required to obtain a per-
mit required by SMA prior to undertaking their substantial 
development? 
Governmental agencies essentially affect the environment 
in two ways. They grant permission, a part of their regulatory 
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functions, to private parties who, in turn develop projects af-
fecting the environment. The governmental agencies may initiate 
and develop projects of their own. The court notes that either 
function may involve more than one "major action" although there 
is only one p~oject. Each stage in a series of decision making, 
if "major", would require an EIS. The court states ·:;tl:iat .the 
third renewal of the building permit was a "'major action' be-
cause it involved a discretionary and nonduplicative stage of 
the building department's approval proceedings relative to an 
ongoing major project."13 The court notes "The fact that the 
private sector undertakes the project, but only with the approval 
of the government does not diminish the 'major' impact of the 
t t · · t. 1114 Th t . t t 1 ' governmen par 1c1pa ion. e cour re1 era es cone usions 
reached in Stempel. The granting of the renewal was nonduplica-
tive because environmental issues were not considered in the 
granting of the original building permit or at any subsequent 
"major action". The intervention of new information or develop-
ments since an earlier "major action" that did not consider en-
vironmental factors would make the action nonduplicative. 
The EIS also provides for the consideration of the ex-
tent to which resources are "irreversably and irretrievably" 
committed. SEPA is not applicable to a project which has 
reached that "critical stage" of completion foreclosing the con-
sideration of environmental protection desired by the act. The 
project, notes the court, prior to the third permit renewal, had 
not reached that critical stage because the possibility of mod-
ification or abandonment remained viable under the substantive 
options available in SEPA. "The building department should 
have begun their review at SEPA's effective date or at such a 
time after SEPA 's effective date that they could anticipate an 
application for a permit renewal would be made .. 1).-~ stated -, the 
court. (The question could be posited: How is one to antici-
pate an application?) The court held that the city should have 
commenced environmental evaluation of the proje ct's impact 
prior to the third renewal, an EIS was required. 
There is no indication in the Eastlake that a factual 
determination had ever been made to ascertain whether or not 
the project was a "major action significantly affecting the 
quallty of the environment". Apparently when the court noted 
that "other undisputed facts of the case are, no EIS has ever 
been prepared on the project at any stage of governmental action 
relating to the project"~ 6they were substituting their judgement 
for that of the administrative in question. When the court found 
that an EIS was required, it was treating the matter, not as a 
question of fact, but as a question of law. Yet no factual de-
termination had been made by the appropriate administratt:Y.e upon 
which the court could rule. 
On the question of whether or not SMA applied in this 
case, the court held that construction of Roanoke Reef condo-
minium had begun before the effective date of SMA, therefore the 
project was exempt from the permit requirements of SMA. 
Loveless v. Yantis17 involves an appeal from an order 
of county commissioners denying application for preliminary ap-
proval of a plat for a multi~amily condominium1onapenisula at 
55 
the sout·he.rrr extremity of Puget Sound. 
The respondant, Loveless, filed an application with the 
County Planning Department for preliminary approval of his 
plat. He was denied, but no reasons were given concerning his 
denial. , Loveless appealed this order to Superior Court. The 
Coopers Point Association and Water Company, requested permission 
to intervene. They were denied, but were allowed to submit briefs 
and argue the merits of the case as amicus curia$. The court then 
found the failure of the commissioners to provide any reason for 
refusing to grant preliminary approval to the plan constituted 
an "arbitrary and capricious" decision (under Administrative 
Procedures Act) and granted the prelimina y approval. Yantis, 
the . appellant, et al, petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ 
o f certiorari authorizing them to intervene. 
There are two issues raised in this: (1) Whether or not 
an EIS is a necessary prerequisite for preliminary approval of 
the plat? and (2) Whether the intervenor-appellants are entitled 
as a matter of right to intervene? (administrative procedures 
issue). 
The court held that the decision to grant preliminary 
approval of the plat for the proposed project constitutes a 
"major action" citing Eastlake and Stempel, while noting that 
''no party to the appeal asserts that the prroject will not signifi-
cantly affect the environment. "18 Again, there had been no factual 
determination of whether the proposed project would have a 
significant effect on the environment. The court seems to be 
transversing its traditional role in Taw<,~ _.,~ in substituting its 
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judgement for that of the administrative body. The court also 
noted: "Nor is there any question but that the preliminary ap-
proval of a plat involves discreation and in this case is non 
duplicative."19 
It was claimed by Yantis in this case that the "inter-
vention of right" is applicable. The court Civil Rule of Super-
ior Court applicable CR 24(a) which states: 
when the applicant claims an interest relating to the 
property or transaction which is the subject of the ac-
tion and he is so situated that the disposition of the 
action may as a practical matter impair or impede his 
ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's 
interest is adequately represented by existing parties. 
The court found that each of the intervenors has the necessary 
interest in the property. The Cooper Point Association are all 
residents of the area affected, and the association has a di~ 
rect enough interest to challenge the administrative actions. 
The court ruled, the nature of a preliminary plat estab-
lishes that it is not merely an insignificant stage of the pro-
ceeding without real consequence. Decision made by the county, 
that may have a permanent impact on the intervenors, such as the 
approval of a preliminary plat, demands that they consider en-
vironmental factors. 
The Supreme Court cases of Leschi Improvement Council v. 
Washington State Highway Commission20 is an appeal from a judge-
ment of the Superior Court dismissing an action to review a 
state highway commission hearing relating to issues of a li-
mited access and design of a limited access highway. The purpose 
of the hearing was to establish that a segment of Interstate 
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Highway 90 which extends from the west shore of Mercer I sland to 
the point where the highway will intersect I nterstate 5 in Seattle, 
would be designated as a limited access facility. 
Issues raised in the case included: (1) grounds for 
standing under SEPA's "right to a healthful environment" clause; 
(2) standards of judicial review applicable under SEPA; (J) rela-
tionship between EIS and each person's "right to a healthful en-
vironment; (4) appl ication of SEPA in conjunction with other state 
statutes; (5) what questions of law are subject to review un-
der SEPA; and, (6) the application of the doctrine of laches. 
The Leschi Improvement Council, petitioners/appellants, 
challenged the findings and order of the Highway Commission, 
as it relates to the overall design of the highway(not re-
lated to the limited access questions}through a petition for a 
writ of certiorari. They admit they are not abutting proper-
ty owners entitled to review under RCW 47.52 (Limited Access 
Facilities Act), but allege they are directly affected by noise 
and noxious fumes emanating from t he motor vehicles which use 
the highway. They seek to invoke standing under SEPA. 
SEPA is interpreted by the courts as having broad ap-
plicability. Even though the proceedings in this case were 
initiated under the Limited Access Facilities Act, the court 
found the petitioners had standing to raise SEPA issues be-
cause "the provisions of SEPA are engrafted on the existing 
statutory authorizations ... 21 
This is the first case in which the Supreme Court has 
interpreted environmental rights. The grant of standing on the 
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"right to a healthful environment" was made clear by the court: 
The right of petitioners affected to a "healthful en-
vironment" is expressly recognized as a "fundamental 
and inalienable" right by the language of SEPA. The 
choice of this language in SEPA indicates the strongest 
possible terms the basic importance of environmental 
concerns to the people of this state.22 
How expansive this grant of standing becomes in future years 
remains a question. The court in Leschi has granted a substan-
tial right based on the language inherent in "fundamental and 
inalienable right to a healthful environment". In granting 
such a legal right the court has granted standing to anyone 
claiming they are an "aggrieved" party under SEPA. A person 
"aggrieved" by an administrative actiqn whose legal right is 
invaded has the right to review that action under the Washington 
Administrative Procedures Act (APA). A person aggrieved is one 
whose legal right is invaded by an act complained of, II . . . 
(Blacks Law Dictionary, 4th ed. rev. 1968) The court has inter-
preted the legislative grant to the people to a right to a health-
ful environment as the grant of a legal right. Whenever a branch 
of state government makes a determination whether or not a pro-
posal may "significantly affect the qualtiy of the environment" , 
a citizen's legal right is thus at issue. The court reasons: 
The court has the inherent power to adjudicate the 
adequacy of an EIS as a question of law ••• A deter-
mination of adequacy necessarily determines the legal 
rights of the parties as to the disputed project .•• 
Under SEPA an agency's decision to approve a project 
impliedly, if not expressly, determines that the pro-
ject is consistent with the citizen's fundamental right 
to a healthful environment ••• These agency conclusions, 
either expressly or impliedly, are questions of law be-
cause they are not 'independent of or anterior to any 
assertion as to their legal effect• 0 2J 
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How all-encompassing the citizen's legal right to a healthful 
environment is, pertaining to governmental actions remains to 
be further clarified by the evolution of case law. However, it 
is apparent, the Supreme Court is not reticent in its opinions 
concerning the people and their environment. 
The decision in Leschi contains a thoughtful presenta-
tion in response to two questions regarding judicial review: 
(1) What standards of review are appropriate to a trial court 
examining the record of an administrative agency before it on a 
writ of certiorari? and, (2) What standards the Supreme Court 
shall use to review the findings of the trial court? 
The Supreme Court has said that judicial review of 
findings of fact made by administrative agencies is limited to 
a determination of whether the administrative findings are sup-
ported by substantial evidence and have a rational basis.24 
In this case, the highway commission made no finding as to whe-
ther the EIS before it was adequate. Such a finding if it had 
been made, notes the court, would have been an application of 
law to the facts before it and as such would have been review-
able by the trial ceurt ··as ·~ a · question .:;of · 1avu(a ,new ·- sense of re-
straint? ). "A determination of adequacy" found the court, 
"necessarily determines the legal rights of the parties as to 
the disputed project. Courts have inherent power to adjudicate 
the adequacy of an EI S as a question of law, reviewable on ap·- ·· l-. 
peal."25 The Administrative Procedures Act describes the scope 
of judicial review. The two standards most applied by the court 
are 34.07.130(6)(e) and (f) which states that the court may remand 
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the case for further proceedings because the administrative find-
ings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: 
(e) clearly erroneous in view of the entire record 
as submitted and the public policy contained in the act 
of the legislature authorizing the decision or order; or 
(f) arbitrary or capricious • • 
The trial court may conduct additional fact finding in 
order to rule on the adequacy of an EIS or they may remand a 
case holding . the administrative agency to a high standard of 
articulation.26 The court ruled that "either procedure may be 
employed by the reviewing court in . its discretion. 1127 The court 
also expressed its view in reviewing the findings of the trial 
court's examination of an administrative agency's action on a 
writ of certiorari, they would not be disturbed on appeal "if 
they are supported by substantial evidence. 1128 
The relationship between EIS and the citizen's right to 
a healthful environment is important. The EIS is the principal 
means by which the administrative agency can evaluate environ-
mental factors in determining whether or not to approve a pro-
ject. The court ruled: 
Under SEPA an agency's decision to approve a project 
impliedly, if not expressly, determines that the pro-
ject is consistent with the citizen's fundamental 
right to a healthful environment and with the legis-
latively mandated policy that an agency action allow 
to citizens the widest practicable ran~e of beneficial 
uses of the environment without degradation.29 
As has been mentioned, since the court has held that the adequacy 
of an EIS is a question of law, it is reviewable by the court. 
Regarding the doctrine of laches (making application for 
redress of negligence in the performance of a legal duty), the 
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court held that the failure to timely proceed on grounds of 
violation of the provisions of the SEPA against government pro-
jects can be a bar to such suits by its application. The court 
also held that the application of the doctrine of laches is on 
a case-by-case basis. 
The major issue raised in the minority opinion involved 
the question of standing and the subsequent grant of a legal right 
to a "healthful envi:ronment" under SEPA. If the majority opinion 
holds, contends the minority, then any citizen may obtain judi-
cial review of any administrative proceeding involving a decision 
which affects him, however indirectly. Interesting questions are 
raised in t he Leschi case: What is the legal ambit of a citizen's 
(environmental) standing under Washington law? How directly must 
a citizen be affected to gain standing before the court? 
A SMA case, State DOE v. City of KirklandJO involves the 
issuance, by the City, of a substantial development permit author- · 
izing the construction of an all-weather moorage facility on 
Lake Washington by the Biltman, Sanders, Hasson Corporation. 
The DOE and attorney, plaintiffs, sought a review of this matter 
by the Shoreline Hearings Board. After a review of the record 
made before the Board, three membersvoted to uphold the permit, 
and three members voted to modify 'the permit. SMA requires that 
four members votes are needed to approve the permit, or the de-
cision of the local government holds. The Supreme Court held 
that the three to three vote, which had the effect of affirming 
the City's (defendant) position, was a final order reviewable 
by the Superior Court, even though the statute required four t'• 
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votes for adoption of a Board decision. 
The court's criteria which it applied in order to deter-
mine if the administrative orders were reviewable is when: "They 
impose an obligation, deny a right, or fix some legal relation-
ship as consummation of the administrative process ... 31 The 
tie-vote Board determination resulted in the decision of the 
City standing affirmed. As such, found the court, it met the 
previously mentioned criteria and thus, rendered that decision 
ripe for review. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the grant of the writ of man-
damus issued by the Court of Appeals. The Superior Court was 
directed to assume jurisdiction of the case and to review the 
City's posit ion, as SMA requires four votes for adoption of a 
Board decision. 
The Supreme Court case of Narrowsview Preservation Asso-
ciat~on v. City of Tacoma32 arises on an appeal from a judgement 
of the Superior Court, upholding the validity of a zoning ordi-
nance rezoning an 89 acre tract from single family dwelling to 
planned residential development. A portion of the 89 acres, 
sloping down toward the Tacoma Narrows, is within 200 feet of the 
Puget Sound. Selden, one of the respondents, filed an application 
to have the property rezoned to planned residential development 
to allow the construction of approximately 1,100 apartment units 
in 3-story structures. 
The Narrowsview Preservation Association, the plaintiff, 
brought a writ of certiorari before the Superior Court. They 
sought to review the actions of the planning commission of city 
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council of the City of Tacoma, the defendent, who adopted an or-
dinance which rezoned the ~9 acre tract. The Superior Court 
upheld the validity of the amendment to the ~oning ordinance 
of the City of Tacoma. 
Two issues are raised in this case: (1) Whether the City 
had failed to comply with the requirements of SEPA requiring an 
EIS in major a ctions significantly affecting the quality of the 
environment--in particular, what constitutes ..: "significant"? and 
(2) Whether the City improperly failed to require a shoreline 
development permit from the developer? 
A question of law pertains to the interpretation of the 
term "significantly" in SEPA requi·ting cities and other public 
agencies to include an EIS in every major action "significantly" 
affecting the environment. Use of the term, found the court in-
cludes examination of the extent to which the action will cause 
adverse environmental effects in excess of those created by exis-
ting uses in an area, and absolute quantitative adverse environ-
mental effects of the action itself, including cumulative harm 
that results from contribution to existing adverse conditions 
or uses in affected areas. This represents a change in empha-
sis, from significant actions to adverse actions. 
The planning commission had obtained comments from vari-
ous affected local and state agencies concerning environmental 
impact of the proposed rezoning, and held full public hearings. 
Based upon evidence collected, the commission decided that the 
rezoning would not have a substantially greater impact on the 
area than the development of the property under its pres-ent 
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zoning. The court found that the decision was neither arbitrary 
or capricious. Therefore, an EIS was not required. The court 
found that it would not be inconsistent however, if at a later 
time, when additional information was made available, the com-
mission decided to require an EIS for any further approval for 
"action'~ : such as when application is made for approval of a 
preliminary pl at or building permit. At such times, reasoned 
the court, more details of the specific structures would be forth-
coming and use of the property more clearly defined. This would 
repres~nt, in fact, a nonduplicative and discretionary decision. 
The court held that the reclassification of an area to 
a planned residential development does not have the effect 
of authorizing construction upon the property involved: "The 
act of rezoning does not involve any physical alteration of 
the land or irrevocable commitment to allow such a physical 
alteration. 1133 Thus, rezoning is not within the meaning of 
"development" under SMA, and a shoreline development permit 
is not required. It should be mentioned here that SEPA is 
primarily concerned with governmental actions that may signi-
ficantly and adversely affect the quality of the environment• 
whereas, SMA focuses on the management and development of the 
state's shore.lines. Within the context of SMA, "development" 
means: "a use consisting of the construction or exterior altera-
tion of structures ••• or any project of a permanent or tempor-
ary nature which interferes with the normal public use of the 
surface of the waters overlying lands subject to this chapter 
at any state of water level. 11 34 
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The case of Byers v. Board of Clallam County Commis-
sioners35 arose when the County Commissioners, the defendant, 
passed an interim zoning ordinance for a portion of the county. 
Byers, (citizens, taxpayers) plaintiff and respondant, challenged 
the ordinance by a writ of certiorari. A subsequent hearing be-
fore the Superior Court resulted in the ordinance being held in-
valld. The Board (and Planning Commission) appealed. 
The respondents were granted the writ of certiorari by 
the 'Supreme Court as the court recognized it as an appropriate 
remedy to test the reasonableness and validity of a zoning or-
dinance; and, to determine if the initial adoption of a zoning 
code is a major action, requiring an EIS under SEPA, if the adop-
tion of such a code significantly affects the environment. 
The Board did not contend that the zoning ordinance was 
not a "major action" (the ordinance involved, included 30 pages 
of detailed zoning regulations). Rather, they submitted that the 
wor.a "action" as ·used in SEPA is synonymous with the word "pno-
ject". The court disagreed, citing relevant section of SEPA 
which states than an EIS is required in every "recommendation or 
report on proposals for legislation and other major action sig-
nificantly affecting th~ quality .of the environment. 1136 The 
court held that the adoption of a zoning ordinance is a "major 
action" in that it is discretionary and nonduplicative. The or-
der of the Superior Court holding Clallam County's interim zon-
ing ordinance invalid, was affirmed. 
Hama Hama Company v. Shorelines Hearings Boarct3? is. a 
statutory interpretation case. It involves provisions of SMA 
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relating to standing and time limits for appellate review of 
the granting of a substantial development permit to Hama Hama, 
the plaintiff, by Mason County. The granting of the permit was 
appealed to the Board by DOE and the attorney general. The Board, 
the defendant, denied motions made by Hama Hama to dismiss the 
appeal. Thereafter the Superior Court for Thurston County issued 
a writ of certiorari and, subsequently, entered an order direct-
ing the Board to dismiss the appeal because: (1) the attorney gen-
eral lacked standing to appeal; and (2) the DOE 's appeal was un-
timely. The attorney general and DOE appealed. 
The pertinent facts are as follows (dates given since 
they are at issue). On October 15, . 1973, Mason County granted 
a substantial development permit to the Hama Hama Company to 
construct a pier on Hood Canal. The DOE received a copy of 
the permit on October 19, 1973. I n response, DOE and the attor-
ney general file "Request for Review" with the Board on Novem-
ber 29, 1973. A copy of this request was in the possession of 
Mason County officials on December 3, 1973. At the time of is-
suance of the permit, Mason County had not yet adopted a master 
program which is to serve as a guideline for the issuance of such 
permits. 
Essentially, the issues in question in this case are: 
Whether the attorney general is a party to the appeal of the 
court? Whether the attorney general or only DOE has standing to 
appeal to the Board, and what is the time limit as to the DOE 
and/or the attorney general for perfecting such an appeal? 
And, What is the commencement date of the period for appealing 
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to the Board? 
The Supreme Court held that where a section of a statute 
deals with an issue in a general manner and where a section of 
the statute deals with the same issue in a more detailed manner, 
the latter will be accorded preeminence. Thus, while RC W 90. 5.8-
.140 (SMA) essentially deals with the issuance of permits and on-
ly incidentally mentions appeals procedures, RCW 90.58.180 (SMA) 
"is essentially dedicated to describing the appropriate proce-
dures for appeals. 11 38 This section grants both DOE and the at-
torney general standing to appeal to the Board, and the time li-
mit is 45 days. The court's opinion here is in keeping with the 
legislative intent of SMA which states it be "liberally construed 
to give full effect to the objectives and purposes for which it 
was enacted ... 39 
Regarding when a document is "filed", the Court applied 
the general rule that a document is "filed when it is actually 
received by the proper authority ••• in the instant case. 1140 
DOE and the attorney general are within the time limits for per-
fecting the appeal. 
The decision of the Superior Court was reversed and the 
case remanded to the Superior Court for Thurston County for fur-
ther proceedings consistent herewith, so held the court. 
In Johnston v. Grays Harbor Coupty41 Johnston, the plain-
tiff, sought a writ to review the issuance of a conditional use 
permit by the County, the defendant, for the construction of a 
mobile home park. A Mr. ~ntheim had applied for a condit i onal use 
permit to construct and operate a mobile home park of approximately 
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23 units. The subject property consists of 8 acres in an area 
zoned for general development in which mobile home parks may be 
permitted as a conditonal sue. The Board of County Adjustment 
had conducted hearings, attended by the plaintiff, who opposed 
the permit. The permit was granted for 13 units, but the Board 
failed to make a final finding of the potential environmental im-
pact of the proposed project. 
The Superior Court denied the writ to review, but remanded 
the matter to the Board. It found substantial evidence to sup-
port the order but· had found an environmental assessment to be 
lacking. Following the remand, an assessment of the environ-
mental impact was prepared, filed, and available for public in-
spection at the planning office. The Board in a subsequent hear-
ing decided the action may be "major" under SEPA, and yet be 
deemed not to significantly affect the quality of the environment. 
Johnston'S .pet:i.itiun for a writ of certiorari was denied and the 
appeal foll owed. 
The Court of Appeals held that, while the Superior Court 
found there had not been ·.:compliance with SEPA, the County Board 
of Adjustment did not err in limiting discussion at the hearing 
following the remand to "something new", rather than re-duscussing 
previous matters. It must be emphasized, the remand was for the 
limited purpose of bringing the action into compliance with SEPA . 
Th~ denial of ·the "petitiOn for writ of certiorari was 
affirmed. 
The Supreme Court case Norway Hill Preservation & Pro-
tection Association v. King County Counci142 involves the ap-
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proving of a preliminary plat for Norway Vista, a proposed hous-
ing development, by the King County Council, the defendant. The 
As sociation, the plaintiff, petitioned the Superior Court for a 
writ of certiorari to review the decision. The Assoication spe-
cifically challenges the Council's determination that an EIS was 
not required. The Superior Court denied the writ and the Associ-
ation appealed from the judgement. 
Norway Vista, subject of the preliminary plat, consists 
of 523 heavily wooded acres, located just south of the city of 
Bothel. The proposed plat plan for Norway Vista provides for 
the creation of 198 lots, each with a single family dwelling. 
Adjoining properties to the east and south have been developed 
to an urban residential density (approx. 4 dw. units/acre). To 
the North the land had been cleared and there are scattered re-
sidences on ~ to 3 acre parcels. 
The Director of the Land Use Management Division of the 
County Department of Planning had determined that an EIS was not 
necessary. The County zoning and subdivision examiner recommended 
approval of the preliminary plat application and concurred with 
earlier determination that an EIS was not necessary. 
After subsequent appeals by the Association and addition-
al hearings the King County Council approved the preliminary plat. 
Following this decision, the Association petitioned the Superior 
Court for a writ of certiorari, asserting the Council had acted 
unlawfully in approving the preliminary plat without requiring 
an EIS . The Superior Court det ermined that the Norway Vista 
Plat was not a major action significantly affecting the environ-
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ment. The court further found that King County had acted 
reasonably and not arbitrarily or capriciously. 
The Supreme Court rules that determinations of no 
significant impact under SEPA , i.e. "negative threshold deter-
minations", require a reasonably broad standard of review1 "We 
believe that in addition "to the 'arbitrary or capricious' standard , 
the broader 'cl early erroneous' standard of review is appropriate ."43 
The court determined it was necessary, under the proper scope of 
judicial review applicable to "negative threshold determinations" 
made pursuant to SEPA to "consider the broad public policy pro-
moted by that act. Briefly stated: 
t he procedural provisions of 
mental full disclosure law. 
the policy of fully informed 
ment bodies when undertaking 
affecting the quality of the 
SEPA constitute an environ-
The act's procedures promote 
decision making by govern-
' major a ction significantly 
environment.• 1144 
The "clearly erroneous " standard provides the court with 
·a broader review than the "arbitrary or capricious" standard be-
cause it mandates a review of the entire record and all of the 
evidence to support the administrative finding or decision. 
The Supreme Court held that the Council's determination 
that approval of the Norway Vista Plat did not require an EIS 
was "clearly erroneous". I n so holding the court found: Gen-
erally, the procedural requirements of SEPA , which are designed 
to provide full environmental information, should be invoked when-
ever more than a moderate effect on the quality of the environ-
ment is a reasonable probability; I n addition to its magnitude, 
the project will constitute a complete change in the use of the 
existing areas"(which further defines the judicial interpretation 
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of ''significant") • 
The appeal to the Supreme Court in Swift v. Island 
County45 involves a challenge to a determination made by the 
planning director of Island County, the defendant, that no t· 
EIS under SEPA was required for the approval of three plats and 
building permits for a development known as "Seabreeze" in Key-
stone Harbor, Whidbey Island. Action was brought seeking to 
enjoin work on a subdivision development and an order directing 
Island County to comply with the provisions of SEPA. The Super-
ior Court entered a judgement of dismissal. Plaintiffs, Swift 
appealed. 
Issues raised in the case are (1) What standard of re-
view is appropriate when a court reviews an agency's "th~eshG>J:d" 
determination under SEPA and was that standard met? (2) Did the 
county take a "piecemeal" approach to SMA and SEPA questions 
presented by a single project? (J) Can agencies issue approvals 
for a development without seeking assurances that SEPA has been 
complied with. 
The area involved is separated from the waters of Puget 
Sound by a narrow strip of land, and it is an area of historical 
significance as it is included in the Central Whidbey Island His-
torical District, which has been placed in the National Register 
of Historic Sites. The county planning commission rejected the 
plat submitted by the Dillingham Development Company. The county 
commissioners overruled the planning commxssion and granted pre-
1 iminary approval. 
Shortly after work had begun, appellant, Swift, made a 
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refuted the findings of the planning director. Thus, the court 
held that: "in light of numerous agency reports expressing con~ 
cern as to the effect of development of subdivision on the environ-
ment, the county planning director's finding of 'no substantial 
impact', thereby bypassing a preparation of an EIS, together with 
various subsidiary findings, were clearly erroneous. u46 As to 
the standards of judicial review, the writ held as it did in 
Norway: "The review standards of 'clearly erroneous' ••• best 
promote that policy of disclosure U> f SEP~ by not insulating 
agency determination from court review by too strict a standard 
of review. ,,47 
The final case in chapter three, is Hayes v. Yount48, 
a Supreme Court case, coming under SMA (and to a very limited 
extent, SEPA). The respondent Hayes owns approximately 90 acres 
of unimproved land, which is a saltwater marsh habitat. The en-
tire site is part of the area designated by the legislature as 
"shorelines of state wide signigicance". Surrounding land use 
include three lumber mills, a boat marina and a sewage settle-
ment basin across the slough to the north. 
Hayes filed with Snohomish County his application for a 
substantial development permit. The application sought a per-
mit to operate a solid waste landfill and to continue to expand 
trans-shipping capabilities and heavy industrial use. Hayes' 
publication of notice of hearing on the application described 
the proposed development as a "marine industrial area". 
The County determined that the project constituted a 
"major action significantly affecting the qualtiy of the environ-
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ment". An EIS was prepared pursuant to SEPA. The planning 
staff and planning commission of the County recommended denial 
of the permit by Hayes. These findings were considered and rejec-
ted by the County Commissioners who granted a permit for operation 
of a solid waste landfilland .marine industrial area. 
Yount (et al. , appellants .) filed a formal request for 
review by the Shoreline Hearings Board. The Board found that 
the ecological impact of the proposed fil l would be insignif i-
cant. The Board concluded that the permit was too vague to as-
certain the extent to which the proposed use was consistent with 
the policy set forth in SMA . 
Hayes filed in Superior Court petition for review of the 
the Hearings Board's decision. The court granted Hayes' motion 
for summary judgement, holding "certain actions of the Shoreline 
Hearings Board arbitrary and capricious and concluding that as 
applied to this particular set of facts the order and regulation 
constitute an unconstitutional taking of property ... 49 
Agency action is determined "arbitrary or capricious" if 
there is no support in the record for the action which is there-
fore "willful and unreasoning action, in disregard of facts and 
circumstances ... 5o 
A question of law is the essential issue in this case: 
By relying in part on "Use Activitty Guidelines for SMA: Land-
fill Activities", was the Shoreline Hearings Board's decision · 
to vacate the permit a proper exercise of its authority? The 
Landfill Use Guideline, WAC 17J-16-060(14)(c) states that land-
fills should be located away from water bodies because leachates 
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from the land f ill might reach the water body, having a del eterious 
effect on the quality of the adjacent water. 
The Board vacated the County grant of approval : the court 
helq . (even though the Board had not shown proof of harm to adja-
cent waters from leachates) "We decline to reverse the administra-
tive conclusion of law with respect to WAC 17J-16-060(14)(c)."51 
In commenting on the intent of SMA, when applying the 
policy of SMA in its holding, the court found that the permit was 
so vague it rendered virtually impossible, the court's ability 
to review the consistency of the proposed project with SMA poli-
cy. The court noted: 
The policy of preference for water-dependent use re-
flects the legislative's careful attention to an im-
portant concept of environmentally sound based land 
use planning. Encouraging uses not dependent on the 
shoreline to locate in inland areas is an effective 
aid in the resolution of competing demands on our 
limited shorelines resources.53 
This concept of encouragement is more than that, en-
couragement with the compelling force of law, is close to 
coercion. While the court held the taking issue did not ap-
ply in this case, the line between encouragement and unrea-
sonable coercion should be continuously monitored to ensure 
the rights of private property remain in balance with the 
public's interest in the use of the shoreline. 
As this chapter has demonstrated, the courts in Washington 
are nothing, if not vigorous in tneir application of environmental 
law to development initiated conflicts. It also appears that the 
court has granted the people of the state a substantive legal 
right to a healthful environment, the future will tell how that 
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right proceeds to be f\lrther refined by the courts. Will it 
lead to a more substantive "good faith" effort of administra-
tive implementation? Or will the courts begin making substantive 
decisions if the administrative body merely adhers to proce-
dural correctness in an attempt to avoid litigation? 
In Eastlake, the court stated: 
The particular choice ultimately arrived at, be it aban -
donment, alteration, or permission ~ to complete con-
struction, is not dictated by SEPA.9 It is the evalua-
tion of pertinent environmental factors that is manda-
ted. 54 
Footnote 6, if f\lrther pursued and expanded, would allow the 
court to rule on substantive questions. thus, it would appear 
to be trespassing on the jurisdictional boundaries of the admini-
strative body if it so acteda 
Though a substantive result is not dictated by SEPA. 
Where advense environmental impact is indicated, the 
approval of such a project may reveal an abuse of 
discretion by the public agency where mitigation 
or avoidance of damage was possible.55 
And as we have already seen, whether or not a project may have 
an adverse impact on the environment, since it affects the legal 
rights of citizens to a healthf\11 environment, is a question of 
law, reviewable by the court. The legal ambit of environmental 
management may indeed be all encompassing. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
SUGGESTED ADMINISTRATIVE SCHEME 
Problems due to urbanization, population settlement, in-
dustrial development, technology advancement, and the deple-
tion and dissipation of the state's natural resources, initi-
ated a variety of responses from the legislature. Among the 
most important and encompassing of these responses were the 
three environmental statutes which have been discussed in this 
case study, SEPA, SMA, and ECPA. 
SEPA is essentially an environmental, full disclosure 
law. It requires the consideration of environmental values in 
all major action (governmental decision which is both discre-
tionary and non duplicative) and SEPA requires the preparation 
of an EIS when any proposal involves significant adverse impacts 
on the quality of the environment. Furthermore, the Supreme 
Court of Washington has apparently granted substantive legal 
rights to the people, through its interpretation of SEPA, 
where the legislature declared that the people have a "funda-
mental and inalienable right to a healthful environment." SEPA 
is indeed receiving vigorous application from the courts. 
The legislature recognizes in SMA that the shorelines 
of the state are among its most valuable and fragile of natural 
resources and that it is necessary to initiate a coordinated 
planning and management program between local and state govern-
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ment to ensure that development of the shorelines is cons is-
tent with policy expressed in SMA. The regulatory program estab-
lished under SMA was designed to encourage appropriate shore-
line uses. 
In ECPA, the legislature expressed the concern of people 
who shane an interest in the development of the state's natural 
resources. ECPA offers three ppotential, and essential, assets 
in the process of channeling development through a legal frame-
work: interagency coordination, public participation, and increased 
efficiency in processing the developer's application. 
The suggested administrative scheme proposes using 
ECPA 's master application procedure as the legal structure for 
channeling development, and the EIS as the coordinative vehicle. 
The EIS is the logical coordinative vehicle for inclu-
sion in the administrative scheme. The courts have determined 
that the EIS is a document which reflects the procedural and sub-
stantive decisions made by the appropriate governmental agencies. 
They have also found the EIS to be a primary means to coordinate 
the consideration of environmental values. 
The EIS would serve to bring the SMA permit process in-
to the scheme. In Eastlake, a renewal of a building permit for 
a shorelines development, was deemed a major action, and thus, 
SEPA applied. Thus, it is clear, the provisions of SEPA over-
lay the SMA permit process. In Leschi, the court found that 
the provisions of SEPA are engrafted onto: the existing statu-
tory authorizations . Also regarding SEPA and the SMA permit 
process, SEPA provides that any EIS "shall accompany the proposal 
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through the existing agency rev i ew processes. '.'1 Therefore, a 
coordinative scheme which contemplates using the EIS as the 
coordinating vehicle, would also encompass the SMA permit pro-
cess. 
However, the legislative intent expressed in these 
three statutes could be more fully realized with certain modi-
fications. 
One of the fundamental defects of ECPA is that it is an 
optional procedure; whether or not the state permit system is 
utilized is left to the whims of the developer. As a beginning , 
the master application procedure should be made mandatory f or 
developments with greater than local impact · • . 2 Generally, a 
development with a greater than local impact is one which is 
deemed to have a significant e.ffect on more than one local .,. 
governmenta:J..jurisdiction. Those developments significantly 
affecting more than one jurisdiction would be requrred to enter 
the state mas ter application procedure. This seems reasonable, 
in that once it has been established more than one political 
jurisdiction will reasonably and probably be a f fected, a state 
public hearing will allow the a f fected partie s to express t heir 
views and to submit supporting documents. (A party could be 
requ ired to be an "aggrieved" party to gain standing before the 
hearing, see p . 58 of this study.) 
Trial legislation could be enacted to test this aspect 
of the suggested scheme. An incremental approach would be use-
ful to test for defects, and once improvements were made, the 
procedure could be expanded to include other types of devel op-
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ments. With the proper research and methodology, a category of 
developments could be selected which would avoid litigation on 
the grounds of denial of equal protection. 
An applicant seeking a permit($) : for development which 
needs a major action for its approval, would be required to 
apply for a special development permit at the county permit 
information of fice. A proposal for development which, reasonably 
and probably, would have a greater than local impact, would be 
required to complete a master application form. After the ap-
plicant completes and submits the necessary forms to the informa-
tion office, copies are sent to the local and state agencies 
which might require permits for such development, and to interes-
ted parties. 
A local hearing examiner would also receive copies 
of all the forms, documents, and an environmental checklist. 4 
The local hearing examiner is appointed by the local legisla-
tive body. Legislation could be enacted requiring the exam-
iner not to be a member of the legislature or the local planning 
body. The state would provide procedural and substantive train-
ing for these officials to ensure they are aware of administrative 
~hd procedural requirements for hearings and compliance with 
SEPA. The concept of the local hearing examiner is important. 
The developer is assured that provisions of SEPA are being com-
plied with, which would help to avoid future litigation, and re-
duce unsubstantiated challenges to delay to permit process. Also, 
the public would benefit from a fair hearing conducted by a· 
properly trained official. 
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Afte r the mast er application forms (with spec i a l develop-
ment permit applicat i on i ncluded ) have been rece i ved by the i nfo r -
mation of fice, notice is given f or a local public hearing . Parti-
cipating agencies, local governments ( if development would have 
a greater than l ocal impact) interested parties, and t he appli-
cant are not i f ied . 
The purpose of the l ocal public hearing is to: (1) De-
termine whether or not the pr oposal f or development invol ves any 
s i gnifi cant adverse impacts on the qual ity of the environment ; 
and , (2 ) Determine whether or not t he development would l i kely 
have a great er than local impact. Decisions are to be wr itten, 
wi th specif ic findings of fact, rea soning , and conclusions as 
part of the record, reviewable by the court if necessary . De-
cisions of the hearing examiner are appealable to Superior Court. 
The hearing begins only after the hearing examiner and 
the applicant have received deci s ions f rom the various local and 
state agencies on the proposal for development (those having 
jurisdiction by law or special expertise). After conducting the 
hearing and weighing the evidence presented , if · the examiner con-
cludes an EIS is required, a declaration of significance is i s-
sued. I f the examiner decides that the development meets t he 
"greater than local impact" test, the applicant is required to 
appear at a state public heari ng with the draft EI S. I f the 
proposal is cons idered not to meet the "greater than local im-
pact" test, and no party to the hearing challenges the decision, 
the applicant must submit the draft EIS at the second phase of 
the local hearing--the hearing is not terminated under these 
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conditions. SEPA provisions still apply- - circulation of draft 
EIS to other participating agencies, including the local govern-
ment and the public. However, the suggested administrative scheme . 
would enable the local government to supervise, and have input 
into the preparation of the EIS. It should also have review 
over all stages of the EIS preparation process. This is pro-
vided by granting the local government equal status with parti-
pating state agencies in the state hearing. 
In this suggested administrative scheme, the local gove 1rn-
ment' s role does not conclude with the issuance of the certifica-
tion form, as it does now under current provisions of ECPA's mas -
ter application procedure. Making ECPA mandatory has been per-
ceived by local government as further centralization of the land 
development permit process. Under this scheme local government 
retains some autonomy over the the permit process and increases 
its autonomy over the EIS process. 
The state hearing is required because the development 
meets~ ·the "significant adverse impacts" test and the "greater 
than local impact" test. In this case, a special development per-
mit can be granteru only after the master application forms have 
been completed by the applicant, submitted, circulated, and the 
master application procedure has been successfully negotiated. 
The first phases of the state public hearing is one in 
which the applicant "may submit any relevant information material 
in support of hi s application. Members of the public may pre• 
sent relevant views and supporting materials in relation to any 
or all of the applications being considered, and any SEPA r e-
BJ 
lated documents, including a draft EIS."6 
The first stage of the public hearing is recessed, not 
terminated, to allow parties to bring action on grounds that 
provisions of SEPA have not been complied with, or other grounds. 
The hearing recess enables the applicant to evaluate and incor-
porate comments into the final EIS. Provisions of ECPS's Master 
Application Procedures would now apply. Final decisions must 
be appealed within thirty days unless a modification of the pro-
posed development has been attached to the master application. 
In such a case, the review period is extended thirty days. Re-
view period commences when the master application center sends 
out notification to participating agencies and interested persons. 
Section 70 of the Master Application Procedures pro-
v ides that "any aggrieved by and desiring to appeal any final 
decision of a local government, issued thr ough the provisions of 
this chapter, shall obtain review in the same manner which would 
apply if the local government had not used the procedures of this 
chapter." An "aggrieved" party is one whose legal rights are af-
fected by a governmental decision (seep. 58 of this study). 
Since it has established in Leschi that the adequacy of an EIS 
affects a person's "fundamental and inalienable right to a health-
ful environment", the "aggrieved" party standing provision in t he 
Master Application Procedures allows for the active participation 
of the public in the decision making process envisioned in the 
su ggested administrative scheme. 
Public participation in the EIS process under ECPA's 
procedures has been provided for, especially at the local level. 
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Interagency coordination is enhanced by using the EIS as the 
coordinative vehicle and by enabling local government to comment 
on, and review, the EI S at the state pulic hearing (wher e deve l op-
ment would have a greater than local impact). The use of the 
local hearing examiner would seem to ensure that costly delays 
to the developer's application for permits would be mitigated, 
resulting in a more efficient processing system, Too, the public 
would be assured of a fair hearing. 
However, it is t he administrative decis ion making body 
which occupies the pivotal position in channeling development 
through environmental law . How they make their decisions and 
why, becomes significant. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE FUTURE 
In channeling development through environmental law, 
·the administrative decision making process (environmental manage-
ment) plays a significant role in determining if, and under wha:t "' 
conditions, development will be allowed to occur. Development 
signals a change in the distribution of natural resources, whe-
ther it occurs in the form of mining, the construction of homes, 
or whatever. Economic growth, especially in an economy like ou;rs, 
depends upon development for its sustenance. Development in a 
purely economic sense can be considered as the opportunity to 
the benefits and resources of society, as an expansion of acces-
sibility. Thus, there are large segments of our society de-
manding development. 
On the other hand, with intensifying concern over the 
depletion and dissipation of natural resources, there are groups 
opposing development, and proposing order. Such opposition to 
development can be interpreted, and rightly so, .a-s the . unjust 
denial of opportunity to those desiring to expand their accessi-
bility to society's benefits and resources. 
It is the task of environmental management to consider 
these competing, conflictingclaims over the use of natural re-
sources (order, -conservation,is considered a use), and to reach 
conclusions concerning their allocation. 
85 
86 
Often the questions concerning development take on 
another appearance. Many communities are enacting growth con-
trol ordinances to restrict the movement of people coming into 
the community in order to protect · thoS:e- -=i community's values 
concerning quiet seclusion, aesthetic quality. In other w.ords, 
the community desires order, not development. Should the right 
to maintain desired community values be allowed to interfere 
with people's right to movement? .. Which set of competing claims 
should prevail? Can a reasonable compromise be reached? 
In the early stages of the administrative function of 
government, regulation was its primary responsibility. Land, 
and other natural resources, were considered too abundant to 
require allocation. But, gradually allocation became more im-
portant, until today, planning has become a predominant admini-
strative function in ·determining who should receive the bene-
fits of development and order, and who .should pay the costs of 
development and order. The task is not easy: 
The evolution · of functions of administrative 
agencies has been from regulation, to include allo-
cation, and finally, to encompass planning. All this 
has happened without a sound theory of why the evolu-
tion should go the way it has. There has been a lack 
of theory to direct the development of "administrative 
law" in the United States ••• 
The integration of planning and allocation with the 
original function of the administrative agency--regul~­
tion has resulted in an absence of a body of planning 
law.1 
In this context, environmental management, the mani-
festation of the administrative decision making process in 
channeling development through environmental law, should be 
based on a theory of planning law. Planning,comprising the 
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process of goal stipulation, the ends to be accomplished, and 
law, the le gal means of accomplishing these goals. 
Environmental management, the problems of economic 
growth, and the changing role of government present serious 
difficulties in determining the organizational patterns of com-
munities, and thus, society. These difficulties however, pre-
sent the opportunity for meaningful progress: 
A fundamental use of property combined with new 
methods of political participation will need to be 
found, more in keeping with the need for high infor-
mation and its utilization. The fact that this makes 
social life a scientific problem should not deter us. 
It is politics that makes science moral.2 
The question of whether a theory of planning law can pro-
vide environmental management with a foundation for decision mak-
ing merits further attention. Needed is more research in the 
relatinship between a theory of planning law and the distribution 
of environmental amenities. This case study represents a begin-
ning step on this path. 
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